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ABSTRACT

The historiography of the Fourth Crusade has neglected long-term macroeconomic
developments and its influence on the Fourth Crusade within the Byzantine Empire and the
Italian states of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa. It is well-established that the Venetians rerouted the
crusading forces to Constantinople which caused political, religious, and economic challenges
that altered the Mediterranean world. Yet, the trend of writing on political events and short-term
microeconomics and macroeconomics from 1180 to 1204, has done great disservice to the larger
trans-regional disputes that engulfed the Mediterranean during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
This thesis will attempt to fill the void of the historiography by examining the effects of longterm financial warfare by the Italian states and the Byzantine Empire, through the analysis of
macroeconomic factors, urban geography and planning, and political disputes caused by everchanging alliances and loyalties, which influenced the decision of the Venetians to reroute the
crusading forces to Constantinople.
To provide evidence to support this thesis, an examination of the Chrysobulls ratified in
the late-eleventh and twelfth centuries, Byzantine laws on produce and goods sold in the markets
of Constantinople, and macroeconomic factors (i.e., taxation, tariffs, currency circulation and
minting) will generate a holistic picture of economic developments that influenced the sack of
Constantinople in 1204. The examination of these factors through a different perspective,
provided evidence that the Venetians used the trade war to justify rerouting the crusaders to
Constantinople through political cunning and economic savvy.
ii

The sources provide further evidence that the Republics of Pisa and Genoa aided, albeit
to various extents and often neglecting the Chrysobulls, in both the political and economic
objectives of the Venetians and Byzantines, respectively. This demonstrates that the sack of
Constantinople was not caused by a single event, as historians tend to suggest, but rather by
several important moments throughout the century that fed into the anger and hostility that all
participants held.
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forgotten. May you rest in peace dear friend.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of writing this thesis, and my tenure as a graduate student at the University
of Mississippi, I have been fortunate to receive unwavering assistance from several individuals.
The generosity and willingness to advise me on my research from Professor Jeffrey Watt has
been invaluable to my experience in all aspects of historical research, writing, and study.
Without his steadfast approach to advising, I would have been overwhelmed by the gauntlet that
laid in front of me. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Isaac Stephens and Dr. Joshua
Hendrickson for siting on the thesis committee and providing constructive feedback that has only
enhanced my understanding of the field. All translated works are my own unless otherwise
stated. As such, I owe an acknowledgment to Dr. Jacqueline DiBiasie-Sammons for providing a
unique style of learning to the Latin language. Tt is only appropriate to acknowledge Dr. Karl
Brown at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, my undergraduate advisor who guided me
through my studies and influenced my decision to commit to the University of Mississippi.
Lastly, I would like to further acknowledge my family and friends who have supported me every
step of the way. To my parents, your unending and undying love to see me pursue my academic
career has made all the difference in keeping me motivated to graduate.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract
Dedication
Acknowledgements
List of Illustrations

ii
iv
v
vii

Introduction

1

The Byzantine Empire and Constantinople
Geography of Constantinople
Economic Policy before Manuel I Komnenos, 10th to mid-12th Centuries
Agoras of Constantinople
Economic Policy under Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-80

6
7
10
20
37

The Republic of Venice
Geography of Venice
Venetian-Byzantine Economic Relations, 1098-1192
Economic Policy under Doge Enrico Dandolo, 1192-1205

44
46
48
56

The Republics of Pisa and Genoa
The Republic of Pisa
The Republic of Genoa

61
62
67

The Fourth Crusade
Pope Innocent III and the Holy Lands
Venetian Exploitation of the Fourth Crusade

79
81
87

Conclusion

98

Bibliography

107

Appendix

117

Vita

125

vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE

PAGE

Map of Constantinople in the Twelfth Century ...............................................................118
Constantinople in Relation to Europe and the Middle East .............................................119
Constantinople on the Silk Road......................................................................................119
The Republic of Venice in the Twelfth Century ..............................................................120
Venetian Grosso in Comparison to the Byzantine Nomisma and Hyperpyron ...............121
The Regions of Tuscany and Liguria in relations to the Central Mediterranean .............122
Pisa Commercial and Political Expansion in the Mediterranean .....................................123
Genoese Commercial and Political Expansion in Europe and the Middle East ..............123
The Byzantine Empire after 1204 ....................................................................................124
The Republic of Venice after 1204 ..................................................................................124

vii

I.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a city so marvelous in size that its high walls project so much power and

influence you feel intimidated and dizzy. You see its ports filled with ships unloading with
luxurious goods as people impatiently await to buy them. Imagine walking down a street and
seeing hundreds of shops full of goods just waiting to be sold to eager customers. You are
dressed in the softest of silks dyed in red and purple. You wear a gold ring, emerald necklace,
and ruby bracelets as a heavy coin purse dangles from your side. As you smell the air, you are
taken aback by the fresh produce and flavored meats sold by street vendors. Continuing down the
street, you notice the architectural wonders that so many famous authors had written poems
about centuries prior. You stare up at the enormous churches, statues, and forums dedicated to
emperors and saints from the empires of antiquity. The people walking around are a melting pot
of racial, ethnic, and religious groups: Greeks, Latins, Persians, Egyptians, Christians, Jews, and
Muslims all living together in relative harmony. Now imagine that same city in ruins. Streets are
drenched in blood as bodies litter the roads. The stores that were once teaming with customers
now void of products. The once magnificent buildings and statues burned to a pile of rubble. You
think you are standing in Rome, Jerusalem, or Alexandria, but soon you realize you are wrong.
You are standing in the ruins of Constantinople, and what you are witnessing is the Fourth
Crusade.
Originally named Byzantium after the legend of Byzas who founded the city in 667 BCE,
the city was intended to be a colonial settlement of the Greek city-state Megara. For the next five
hundred years, the city would trade hands among Megara, the Persian Empire, Sparta, and
1

Athens before finally being conquered by the Roman army under Septimius Severus in 196 CE.
The city would eventually be rebuilt to house an imperial residence for the emperors of Rome.
After the death of Emperor Constantine I (d. 337), the city was renamed Constantinople to
commemorate his role in Christian toleration and conversion. Towards the end of the fourth
century, the Constantinian and Valentinian dynasties divided administrative control of the empire
along an east-west axis. The eastern Roman Empire would later be reorganized into the
Byzantine Empire, and its capital, Constantinople.
So how did this magnificent city turn to ruin and why did a crusade target a Christian
city? The answer is both complex and simple. As Constantinople grew and prospered under the
Byzantine empire, it was able to retain its economic and political infrastructure throughout the
early Middle Ages. This allowed the city to seek new trade partners who were eager to acquire
goods from Asia and the Middle East. Bolstered by the First Crusade in 1096, Constantinople’s
economy saw immense growth from the European armies travelling through the city en route to
Jerusalem. On the surface, the city was an economic power, yet in reality, the seeds of discord
and violence were planted. The Italian states of Pisa, Genoa, and Venice began heavily investing
in the city, which caused the local Byzantine market shares in several significant industries to
shrink to a minority. The ensuing trade war engulfed the region and created the conditions that
led to the destruction of Constantinople.
Then what does the Fourth Crusade have to do with twelfth-century trade wars? The short
answer might appear to be – nothing – and yet the crusaders were rerouted to sack
Constantinople. Initially, the Fourth Crusade had all the justified intentions to reconquer the
Holy Lands from the Ayyubid Caliphate. Under the direction of Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216)
the armies of Europe were to capture the Egyptian cities of Cairo and Alexandria to weaken the
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political and military strength of the Caliphate before capturing Jerusalem. The crusaders were
set to sail from Venice to Egypt in 1202 but after they fell into debt, the entire operation was
diverted. No longer was the army’s objective to capture Egypt but rather to capture Zara and
Constantinople to repay their debts.
The historiography of the Fourth Crusade is incomplete as historians have failed to
connect the long-term economic effects of the trade wars and the crusade. Rather than examining
in these long-term economic wars, historians have focused their arguments primarily around two
general concepts: the convergence of political and economic factors from 1180-1202 and
Byzantine economic failures from 998-1204.
The political and economic influences between 1198 and 1202 focus entirely on the
relations between Doge Enrico Dandolo of Venice and Emperor Isaac II Angelos of the
Byzantine Empire. Historians have heavily stressed that the cause of the sack of Constantinople
was because of the differences on economic trade. Thomas F. Madden is one of the foremost
proponents of this argument. His work Enrico Dandolo & the Rise of Venice shows how the
Venetian Doge used his political cunning to persuade the crusaders into attacking
Constantinople, while reforming the Venetian economy in its entirety.1 Other historians suggest
that Doge Dandolo’s economic reforms were rejected by the Byzantines, influencing the decision
to conquer the city rather than continuing to trade with them.2 These arguments support Susan A.
Throop’s argument that the crusades were no longer religious but rather could be used as an act
of vengeance. When examining the Fourth Crusade, Throop analyzes the role the Massacre of

1

Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo & the Rise of Venice, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), xiv.
Louise Buenger Robbert, “Reorganization of the Venetian Coinage by Doge Enrico Dandolo,” Spectrum 49, no. 1
(January 1974): 48-50. For similar arguments see J.K. Fotheringham, “Genoa and the Fourth Crusade,” English
Historical Review 25 (1910); and Gerald W. Day, “Manuel and the Genoese: A Reappraisal of the Byzantine
Commercial Policy in the Late Twelfth Century,” Journal of Economic History 37 (1977).
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the Latins played in the Venetian psyche and its remembrance during the Fourth Crusade.3
The other argument that historians tend to suggest is the failure of the Byzantine
economy from 998-1204. While scholars like Angeliki Laiou and Cecile Morrisson showed the
Byzantine economy growing through numerous economic reforms meant to strengthen the role
of the merchants, they tended to miss an important factor.4 While the reforms were meant to
expand trade and ensure political and economic protections for the merchants and businessmen,
the role of overseas trade with the Italian states proved detrimental to Byzantine imperial growth.
Daphne Penna’s work Byzantine Imperial Acts to Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, 10th-12th Century: A
Comparative Legal Study exams in the legality and the precedence of the many Chrysobulls, or
trade deals, between the Italian states and the Byzantines.5 Yet despite this impressive
investigation into the Chrysobulls and their legal repercussions, Penna does not incorporate the
economic repercussions that the Chrysobulls inadvertently caused. This omission is important
because it influenced the decisions of the Italian states to seek aggressive and often violent
actions against the Byzantines that eventually led to the sack of Constantinople.
The historiography had failed to understand the importance of the long-term economic
factors that resulted in trade wars between the Italian states and the Byzantine Empire. These
economic factors, (i.e., customs taxes and tariffs, price regulation, financial exchange rates,
market share, geography, etc.), were at the core of the late-eleventh-and twelfth-century trade
wars. It is these factors that explained why the Venetians decided to reroute the crusading army
from Egypt to Constantinople. Therefore, this thesis will argue that the Fourth Crusade and the
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Susan A. Throop, Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095-1216, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 3-5.
Angeliki Laiou and Cecile Morrisson, The Byzantine Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 36. See also Angeliki Laiou (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh throughout the Fifteenth
Century (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002).
5
Daphne Penna, The Byzantine Imperial Acts to Venice, Pisa and Genoa, 10 th-12th centuries: A Comparative Legal
Study (Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2012), 1-5.
4
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sack of Constantinople were influenced by macroeconomic factors established through
Chrysobulls that led to the trade wars, Byzantine economic reforms meant to restructure urban
geography and planning, and financial manipulation by the Venetians to reroute the crusaders to
Constantinople.

5

II.

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE AND CONSTANTINOPLE

The Byzantine Empire unintentionally created the conditions necessary for the Venetian
military to justify the sack of Constantinople. Before the beginning of the twelfth century,
Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081-1118) requested military assistance from the Venetians to
help defeat the Norman Kingdom of southern Italy and the Papacy in central Italy. Venetian
leaders saw this proposition as beneficial to their growing mercantile trade, believing that a
weakened Norman Kingdom would increase Venetian control over the Adriatic Sea. With both
parties signing a Chrysobull in 1082, Byzantine-Venetian economic relations started.
The capital city of Constantinople was the center of the economic tensions throughout the
twelfth century. Located on the western shore of the Bosporus Strait, Constantinople connected
trade between European and Asian markets. The city’s agoras and forums, public centers that
housed markets, sold a plethora of goods and commodities from the “exotic” Middle East and
Asia. The city developed numerous ways to ensure the markets flourished and functioned
considerably well. A central avenue that ran east to west provided the merchants a location to
establish shops, industries, and slaughterhouses for trading. The avenue was connected from the
Acropolis in the east where the emperor resided, to the Forum of Theodosius in the center of the
city and further west to the Forum of Arcadius. To ensure the city flourished in trade, the
Byzantines invited neighboring powers to open ports in Constantinople. The Chrysobull of 1082
allowed the Venetians a trading quarter within the city; this was the first of many serious

6

financial gambles that would lead to open hostility. Although the Byzantines found a trade
partner, the geography of Constantinople and of the Aegean Sea had to be overcome to grow the
economy.

II.i.

GEOGRAPHY OF CONSTANTINOPLE

Throughout history, geography has played an integral part in economics and trade.
Mountains, deserts, rivers, and jungles were the barriers that empires faced when establishing
trade outside their territories. The Byzantine Empire faced many geographic hurdles to propel
itself economically. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the geographic hurdles, (i.e.,
diversifying crop yields based on weather patterns, the construction of deep-water anchorages
and ports on the mountainous shorelines, and maritime innovations to traverse the Mediterranean
during the winter months) had been cleared.6 With the hurdles cleared and urbanization
beginning, the Byzantines sought to expand trade across the Mediterranean. Maritime trade
focused entirely on east-west/west-east shipping routes as trade winds heavily restricted northsouth/south-north sailing, and Muslim empires were thus almost entirely excluded from direct
maritime trading in Constantinople.7 This focus on seafaring trade allowed the economy to
accelerate during the eleventh century and provided the motivation to expand influence across
the Mediterranean.
Constantinople’s geographic layout further played a prominent role in the economic
expansion and later violent disputes with the Italian states. The city as a whole sits on a peninsula

6

Laiou and Morrisson, 8-16.
Laiou and Morrisson, 15. While maritime trading with Muslim empires was largely excluded in Constantinople,
Muslim merchants still traded with the Byzantines in Anatolia (Trebizond, Antioch, Cyprus). Muslim merchants
could travel over land to trade in Constantinople’s agoras and forums.
7
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and incorporates seven hills that stretch along the northern half of the city and straddles the
Golden Horn.8 The easternmost side of the city houses the Acropolis, Hippodrome, and other
government buildings connected to the main road that travels across the southern half of the city,
parallel to Marmara Sea’s coastline. This main road was built near the larger ports and supports
the majority of the agoras and forums throughout the city. Because the southern half of the city
was the economic hub of Byzantine trade and commerce, the Italian states were subjected to the
abandoned quarters in the northern half of the city, along the Golden Horn.
The Golden Horn, the major waterway along the northern shoreline of the city, was not
ideal for commerce during the twelfth century. Previously, the area served as the commercial
center of the city before a series of ecological factors rendered the area unsuitable for extensive,
long-term trade. The first issue was the slowing down of water currents which made it more
difficult for ships to traverse the waters and hampered mercantile vessels from leaving the ports
once docked. The issue was exacerbated by the increase in traffic from the ferries transporting
workers from Pera on the northern shore of the Golden Horn. Movement from the shorelines
now had to cope with mercantile ships sailing through the waterway. Secondly, since the currents
slowed, various airborne diseases could travel to the northern shores, establishing a presence that
could kill hundreds. Faster currents pushed diseases from reaching the shores, instead pushing
them eastward. Most likely, many of the diseases came from the neighborhoods in Pera, Sycae,
and Galata. The importance of the water currents helps explain why the Byzantines gave a trade
quarter to Venice along the Golden Horn. With the increased risk of disease and the near
stagnation of currents, Byzantine merchants relocated to the southern half of the city where the
Marmara Sea offered faster currents and disease was pushed out towards the sea. The hills that

8

See Appendix.
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stretched across the city acted as a buffer that prevented airborne disease from travelling south.
In effect, the hills allowed disease to settle on the northern coastline, increasing the potential for
plagues to form and disperse. 9
Another ecological factor the Golden Horn faced was the buildup of silt along the coast,
which rendered the northern ports useless. Water currents carried the sediment downstream and
changed the layout of the coastlines. Since the currents on the Golden Horn slowed, silt began to
build up, especially the closer one got to the Aegean Sea. Harbors became useless and unsuitable
for mercantile trade despite several attempts by the Byzantines to remove it, specifically in the
Harbor of Neorion.10 The presence of silt buildup on the southern coastline of the Golden Horn,
along with a slowed current and increase in disease, signaled to the Byzantine merchants to
relocate their shops to the southern half of Constantinople. The resettlement of merchants gave
the Byzantine emperors an opportunity to develop the abandoned lands into trade quarters. The
emperors could then grant immovable property to the Italian states, knowing the Italians would
not think twice about why they are receiving so much property. 11
The importance geography had on an economy is profound, especially throughout the
Middle Ages. Mercantile trade had become essential for Mediterranean empires and republics,
allowing them to bypass mountains, forests, and marshes and to attain greater economic
expansion and an increase in profits. During the early Middle Ages, the Golden Horn played an
important role for the Byzantine Empire in maritime expansion. Yet, as the Golden Horn’s
currents began to slow, it became harder for ships to traverse, effectively increasing the time that

Paul Magdalino, “The Maritime Neighborhoods of Constantinople: Commercial and Residential Functions, Sixth
to Twelfth Centuries,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 54 (2000): 218.
10
Magdalino, 215.
11
Immovable Property grants involved one entity giving physical buildings (including, churches, harbors, etc.), and
the land on which the building rests, to another entity for a period of time. In this situation, the Byzantines granted
immovable property to the Venetians in the northern, mostly abandoned, buildings in Constantinople.
9

9

goods were onboard. This became increasingly important during the Byzantine economic
recession of the seventh and eighth century because the slower currents forced an increase in
market prices for mercantile goods. The current’s slow pace exacerbated the rise of disease north
of the city’s hills. This stagnation drove the need to relocate the merchants south, decreasing the
liability of economic contraction during outbreaks.

II.ii.

ECONOMIC POLICY BEFORE MANUEL I KOMNENOS, TENTH TO MID-

TWELFTH CENTURY

Prior to the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, Byzantine economics decelerated and
condensed. While still reliant on its geographic proximity in Eurasia, its status as a gateway to
the east, and the start of the Silk Road in Europe, the empire reformed its economic policies to
accommodate a shifting Eurasian economy.12 Beginning with agricultural reforms outlined in the
Farmer’s Law and Fiscal Treatise of the eighth and tenth centuries, respectively, Byzantine
emperors sought to realign and consolidate farming practices that benefited wealthier peasants
and relied less on the need of smaller independent peasant farmers.13 Farmer’s Law set the
precedent of securing private property rights for Byzantine farmers. While its focus centered on
farmers in Anatolia, its private property protections influenced twelfth-century emperors to
reform Byzantine policy. The Fiscal Treatise, which further established strong property rights for
wealthier peasant farmers, enabled future emperors to justify broad economic reforms that

12

See Appendix.
Leo III the Isaurian, Leges Rusticae, trans.W. Ashburner, “The Farmer’s Law,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 32
(1912): 87-95.
13
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protected Byzantine property rights.14 These imperial laws laid the foundations for the protocapitalist economic reforms that Manuel I Komnenos enacted to protect Byzantine trade during
the late-twelfth century.
By the time the first Chrysobull was signed with Venice, the economic reforms from the
eighth to tenth centuries had strengthened Constantinople’s markets. Prompted by the stagnation
of disease and sediment build up along the Golden Horn, Byzantine emperors undertook massive
infrastructure projects in the neglected southern ports. Many of these ports had been constructed
during antiquity with no real renovations since, preventing the expansion of mercantile trade.
The Harbors of Theodosius and Julian/Sophia, which were built centuries prior during the
Roman Empire and subsequently neglected, were the first to undergo reconstruction. The Harbor
of Theodosius was renovated to accommodate the growing aristocratic residents along the
southwestern shores, while the Harbor of Julian/Sophia was originally built to provide trade with
the large markets and private businesses that flourished along the southeastern shores.15 The new
ports attempted to weaken the economic power of Italian trade in the city by allowing the
Byzantines to rely less on their northern ports, controlled by the Italians, by gaining economic
freedoms. Despite the reconstruction of harbors to boost their economy, Byzantine emperors
soon realized the need for drastic financial reforms that allowed bilateral trade.
For Constantinople to reform itself past a primarily agricultural distribution center of
trade in the early Middle Ages, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081-1118) profoundly
transformed the empire’s market exchanges during the 1090s, and the greatest effect was on
Constantinople and Thessalonike. The annual celebrations of St. Demetrios in Thessalonike

14

Alan Harvey, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Economy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 35-6.
15
Magdalino, “Maritime Neighborhoods,” 215.
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brought foreign merchants to the city and trade overflow caused the markets to adjust.16 First, the
city reduced its agricultural footprint, redistributing its markets throughout the empire, notably at
Raidestos, Halmyros, Ochrid, Dyrrachio and others.17 As a result, monetized gross product in
Constantinople increased by forty percent during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries as
manufacturing and trade replaced agriculture. This increase provided the Byzantines the
necessary financial profits to refit the northern suburbs for trade quarters and allow Italian
merchants into the city. Additionally, the market transformation increased demand for alimentary
products and raw materials in the industrial sector of the city, as the revitalization encouraged
European merchants from Spain, Lombardy, Palestine, Persia, Russia, Hungary, and Italy to
trade goods and services within Constantinople.18 The economic progress of Constantinople was
the heartbeat of the eastern Mediterranean, and its economic power drew the lustful eye of Italian
merchants.
The debasement of the nomisma by Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071-1078) and Nikephoros
III Botaneiates (r. 1078-1081)19 forced Byzantine tax-collectors to request systematic reforms on
taxation laws. The nomisma consisted of lightweight silver coins with low-grade fineness,
ensuring that economic expansion lasted only during a shorter period. With the finished
construction of the new ports, increased agricultural innovations in Asia Minor (three-field crop
rotations, improvements to the windmill, etc.), an increase in demand for foreign investment, and
a decrease in pirating, the nomisma lost its value. At first, the effects occurred in the country-

16

Laiou and Morrisson, Byzantine Economy, 137.
Laiou and Morrisson, Byzantine Economy, 136.
18
Benjamin of Tuleda, Itinerary of Benjamin of Tuleda, trans. Marcus Nathan Adler (New York: Philipp Feldheim,
Inc., 1907), 11-14.
19
Nikephoros III Botaneiates usurped Michael VII Doukas after disagreements regarding issues in Anatolia. He led
his provincial army and additional Turkish mercenaries to remove Michael VII after declaring himself emperor on 2
January 1078. On 24 March 1078, Michael VII was removed from the throne and Nikephoros III was coronated
immediately. For further reading, see Michael Attaleiates, The History, trans. Anthony Kaldellis and Dimitris
Krallis, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2012).
17
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side, as landowners exploited the worthlessness of the silver coins by using them to pay their
farmers. All forms of fiscal obligation were paid in gold, as will be discussed later, which
hindered tax collectors’ ability to generate regional tax income for the empire.20 Furthermore, the
devalued currency discombobulated the uniform tax collection system, greatly reducing imperial
revenue and restricting imperial expenses. As the tax revenue slowed due to the disorder that the
provincial tax policy created, emperor Alexios I Komnenos recalled all devalued nomisma,
quickly replacing them with the stronger hyperpyron. This coin greatly increased the amount of
gold fineness compared to the outdated nomisma. The results were twofold. First, the hyperpyron
increased the value of merchants’ goods and services sold in the agoras while simultaneously
expanding the economic power of the empire. Secondly, the increase in gold fineness allowed
Byzantine landowners to pay their farmers higher wages which resulted in increases in both tax
revenue and purchasing power for the Byzantine subjects which revitalized both the countryside
and the markets within Constantinople.
The conclusion of the First Crusade in 1101 created new opportunities for the
megalopolis to capitalize on the travels of European armies, merchants, and pilgrims that passed
through the city towards the new crusader kingdoms. Byzantine emperors throughout the twelfth
century established provisional markets of exchange to withstand the periodical swell of traffic
and maximize trade. Since each European kingdom coined its own currency, the markets were
tailored to the specific army arriving en masse.21 The problem herein was that the Byzantine
exchange system favored the hyperpyron, as the exchange system was unregulated which caused

20

Alan Harvey, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-1200 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 90.
21
Angeliki E. Laiou and Cecile Morrisson, “Byzantine Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades,” in
The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, edited by Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy
Parviz Mottahedeh (2001): 166-7.
13

corruption. The unregulated exchanges angered the Italian merchants because the rates
artificially decreased the value of not just the Venetian coins but of all foreign coins. While the
provisional markets existed only during large influxes of Europeans, the financial success of the
markets enabled the emperors to permanently establish larger markets. The crusades of the
twelfth century along with the increased Italian presence empowered Byzantine merchants to
demand the markets become permanent and expand them to sustain market demand. The
monetary exchange, which favored the Byzantine hyperpyron, angered Italian merchants who
saw the blatant coercion of price-fixing by the Byzantine banks to heighten their economic
power. Imperial refusal to regulate the exchanges were met with hostile actions, a subject which
will be latter discussed. These markets within Constantinople caused and exacerbated disruptions
between the Italian states and the empire, establishing a foundational dispute that increased
during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos. Additionally, the currency exchanges in Constantinople
were forced to reform as the markets became permanent. The exchanges sought to use the
Byzantine hyperpyron as the only currency in Constantinople, since it was widely accepted in the
Middle East and the empire traded heavily with the Muslim kingdoms, compared to the gold and
silver ingots the Europeans used.22 The unregulated exchange rates influenced the Italian states
to justify violence as a method of negotiating for better rates.
Investment and banking policies and reforms provided additional revenue that
complemented the market exchanges within the city and heightened competition with foreign
merchants. The increase in crusading allowed the Constantinopolitan merchants to demand a
change in banking policies. With the city’s administration approving the requests, merchant
wealth exploded. First, investment banking complemented the increased activity in the agoras,

22

Laiou and Mottahedeh, “Byzantine Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades,” 169.
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as sales and product demand soared during the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, leading many
merchants to request credit.23 Credit allowed the merchants to increase their purchasing capacity,
using their businesses as collateral to obtain loans for renovations or manufacturing supplies or
purchasing more land for animal husbandry. Banking propelled many to become extremely
wealthy, if not challenging the wealth of the emperor then at least challenging his economic
influence. The availability of credit increased as a result, as bankers’ lust for increased finances
led to both larger quantities of credit given and larger credit payments sent. While the banks
primarily issued traditional types of credit and capital, contracts of chreokoinomia became highly
desired by Constantinopolitan merchants.24 The contracts were tailored for each individual or
business and offered unique solutions to solve financial problems. These allowed Byzantine
merchants to establish their various practices and carve out both a commercial niche in the everexpanding economy and to capitalize on the large influx of foreign merchants.
While investment banking rose during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, interest rates
(which remained unchanged since the sixth century), began to rise, albeit unofficially.25 Despite
the interest rates doubling to 8.33 percent for all loan types except maritime (16.67 percent) and
aristocratic (5.55 percent), merchants still demanded them.26 This is significant for two reasons.
First, while rising interest rates were an indicator of market expansion, they created unfavorable
conditions for individuals attempting to start a business in Constantinople. They primarily
23

Laiou and Morrisson, Byzantine Economy, 140.
Laiou and Morrisson, Byzantine Economy, 140. The chreokoinomia is considered by many historians as the
ancestor of the Italian commenda.
25
Laiou and Morrisson, Byzantine Economy, 141.
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targeted foreign merchants looking to expand their business to Constantinople’s markets.
Secondly, The Book of the Eparch, written by Leo VI the Wise (r. 886-912), established strict
regulations for bankers. The regulations stated:
§ I. Any person seeking admission to the corporation of bankers
must produce the evidence of honorable and honest men who will
answer for him that he will not contravene the regulations, that is
to say that he will not sweat or clip either nomismata or miliaresia,
that he will not “coin”, and, in case a public duty demands his
service, he will not entrust to any of his slaves the duties of his
craft since that might lead to grave abuses. Anyone contravening
this will have his hand cut off.
§ II. Money-changers (καταλλάκται) are expected to denounce to
the eparch the itinerant vendors of cash (σακκουλλάριοι) who
stand on the market squares of public streets. They must be
prevented from infringing obligations and service; and if such
changers wittingly fail to notify the eparch they shall be liable to
the above-named punishments.
§ VI. Bankers are forbidden to give credit or cash to their
employees and then instruct them to stand in the squares or streets
to obtain any profit that they may be able to secure. They are also
forbidden to quit their banks or to entrust them to other persons
even on the days of largesse, or of his service. Any person
contravening this shall be flogged, shaved and have his property
confiscated.27
These three subsections of title three, “bankers, money-changers” (Τραπεʒϊται) demonstrate the
strict codes bankers were obligated to follow. They show why the interest rates increased in the
twelfth century and why Constantinople underwent an economic expansion. First, the interest
rates rose because the emperor prevented the bankers from giving credit and capital to any
Byzantine subject regardless of traits that would otherwise be rejected (i.e., debts, immoral
character, non-Constantinopolitan, lack of business awareness, slave without consent from his
master, etc.). Secondly, the number of banks in the city did not rise as rapidly as previously
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thought. The first subsection prevented a majority of the people from entering the corporation of
bankers because those considered “honorable and honest men” were probably aristocrats or
wealthy merchants. This regulation prevented an increase of new banks in Constantinople which
caused the increase in interest rates. As more people needed credit and loans from the banks, the
rate of return on the bankers’ loans had to increase. Thirdly, banks’ inability to loan money to
their employees prevented the banks from increasing their revenue streams. The verse, “stand in
the squares or streets to obtain any profit,” refers to the agoras. Bank employees could not use
loans to establish businesses in the agoras, unless they were to increase the number of banks. By
restricting banks from increasing their revenue streams, The Book of the Eparch effectively
separated the role of the banks from large multi-purpose corporations, limiting the former to
strictly credit-and-capital lending and business savings accounts. Furthermore, the laws stifled
expansion, controlled the rate of growth in Constantinople, and affected imperial revenue. These
policies would be discarded under the reforms of Manuel I Komnenos and contributed to the
Italian state’s increasingly hostile reactions to economic policy and reforms in Constantinople.
The Byzantine mints failed to supply the increased demand for coin and the severely
disconnected process and unregulated market forced the city to halt expansion. After the first
crusade established the crusader states, the new kingdoms began minting their own currencies,
forcing the Byzantines to alter their minting standards. They began minting the Byzantine
hyperpyron in gold and silver to attract the crusaders, hoping to standardize the coins throughout
the crusader states.28 While the administration circulated monies throughout the empire, they
were not distributed equally. The Byzantine treasury accepted gold-based monies, as imperial
expenses dealt exclusively with gold-based currency and discarded the need for the lower-value
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denominations, typically silver and copper.29 As a result, Byzantine merchants created their own
exchange system on the lower-valued coins, resulting in unacceptably undermanaged regulation
that favored the Byzantine hyperpyra. Archaeological discoveries of large quantities of silver
and copper coins throughout the empire prove that the lesser-value denominations were the
standard among Byzantine merchants and common people.30 The undermanagement and
regulation was caused by the unwillingness to use the lower-value currency as a source of
taxation. Moreover the emperor could horde the gold coins as treasure and regulate their
output.31 The archaeological discoveries support this claim since the hoarded collections of gold
coins were only found within the major provincial cities throughout the empire. These issues
created a drastic need to increase foreign investment and trade, leading emperors to grant trade
quarters in Constantinople to the Italian states.
Since the imperial administration focused on gold-based monies, laws regulating private
ownership of gold coins were extreme. Dealers in bullion and money-lenders were subject to
laws that both hampered economic expansion and regulated commercial activity. Stifling the
expansion of monetary circulation hindered economic growth rate and angered both
Constantinopolitan merchants and their Italian counterparts, because it both prevented balanced
monetary exchanges and led to hyperinflation. While the laws in The Book of the Eparch were
from the early tenth century, their outdated regulations were enforced in the early twelfth century
under the reforms of Manuel I Komnenos. The laws in title two regarding the dealers of bullion
and money-lenders (Άργυροπάται) stated:
§ I. We decree that goldsmiths are authorized, when requested, to
buy objects which come within their special scope, gold, silver,
pearls, and precious stones. They may not buy copper or linen
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cloth and generally any articles which belong to the commerce of
other traders. But that shall not prevent them acquiring such
articles for their own use.32
§ V. Whoever takes upon himself to sell silver to be manufactured
and sold shall have his hand cut off.33
§ VIII. We Ordain that every goldsmith is forbidden, whether he
be a freeman, or in servile status, to buy for the purpose of his
business more than a pound of gold not coined whether the same is
manufactured or not.34
§ X. Any person wishing to set up a goldsmith’s workshop shall, if
he is a slave, have his master as his guarantor. The latter shall
justify his guarantee. If he is a freeman he shall produce five
guarantors who will of course be subject to the same liabilities as
the person for whom they stand surety.35
Dealers in bullion and money-lending faced rigid regulation that hurt the monetary exchanges
and angered Constantinopolitan and Italian merchants. As previously mentioned, the imperial
treasury dealt entirely with gold-based denominations and dealers thus were encouraged to buy
gold coins. The caveat was that dealers could not buy more than a pound of gold for each
transaction. This restriction stemmed from the paranoid suspicion of the Byzantine emperors,
who saw merchants’ desire for wealth as concerning. During the eleventh century, emperors
grew suspicious of the increasing wealth and power of the merchant class, resulting in
regulations that decreased the merchants’ ability to make monetary transactions. Furthermore,
the laws were counterproductive, limiting the ability of the companies to mint and circulate
silver-based coins and restricting copper-based denominations. Despite the empire’s economy
growing and expanding (primarily due to an increase in foreign trade), domestic policies on
interest rates, monetary exchanges, minting, and investment banking, greatly hindered growth
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and caused relations to sour between the Empire and the Italian states. The restrictions of monies
eventually caught up with the increased foreign trade, creating a financial crisis that altered the
relationships between the Italian states and the Byzantine Empire.
During these crisis years, economic recession influenced foreign actions that changed the
power balance in Constantinople. This change in balance was caused by two significant issues.
First, the failure to mint and distribute large quantities of gold hyperpyra prevented goods and
services from gaining any real value and slowed the empire’s economic expansion. Secondly, the
secondary market for silver and copper coins prevented fair exchange rates which reduced the
value of goods and led to stagnation in wages in the major cities, among them the
Constantinopolitan merchants. These issues were made worse with the arrival of the Italian
merchants who, using gold-based Veronese coins, caused the lesser-valued currency to
hyperinflate. The Venetian attempt to push the Veronese coins in Constantinople saved the
Byzantine financial system from total economic collapse but strained relationships, leading to the
economic reforms under Manuel I Komnenos.

II.iii. AGORAS OF CONSTANTINOPLE

The Agoras of Constantinople provide a wholistic picture of why trade feuds existed
between the Byzantine Empire and the Italian states. Because this section deals primarily with
the composition of the agoras, it will naturally be more narrative, examining the many different
items sold, their demands in Italy, and finally the reasoning for the hostile actions by the Italian
states to seize control of the markets in Constantinople.

20

The growth of Constantinople is attributed to two events: increased diversification of
goods and services provided and increased trade networks across Europe, North Africa and the
Middle East, and Asia. As both trends developed throughout the late eleventh and twelfth
centuries, the agoras found themselves increasing in size. As was typically the case with
emerging medieval empires and kingdoms, the foundations of an increasing economy began with
agricultural production. The Byzantine Empire lost territory in both southern Italy to the Norman
Kingdom and in eastern Asia Minor to the Seljuk Turks, and cereal production was concentrated
in the territories of Bulgaria, Thessaly, Thrace, Macedonia, and Bithynia.36 These regions,
considered a breadbasket, allowed Constantinople to flourish as it increased its stock of cereal
ten-fold. Further, the agoras benefited from the Greek territories along the Aegean and
Mediterranean Seas, where olive oil and wine were the traditional production staples.
Additionally, due to the richness of soil and the warm seasonal temperatures, legumes, livestock,
various types of fats, beekeeping (which produced honey), and cheeses were also produced
within the empire and diversified the products sold in the markets.37 With the Byzantines losing
territory during the eleventh century, the empire witnessed a population decrease. This allowed
two major agricultural reforms to occur as the number of subjects to feed diminished: first, the
shift from the “village community of landowning, tax-paying peasants…to the estate,”38 and
second, the increase in the construction of mills. The transformation of lands into estates,
primarily owned by either the state or church, allowed for a cohesive and standardized
agricultural practice that ensured both financial success in the markets and an ample food supply.
Not only did this transformation prevent famine throughout the twelfth century but the over-
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production of agricultural products allowed Constantinople, and thus the empire, to export the
goods to struggling neighbors.39 This was made possible only by the organization of the tenant
farmers (paroikoi). The organization of the estates allowed peasants to construct intricate mills
that exponentially reduced labor costs while increasing production. While undoubtably the
Italian states had their own means of acquiring various agricultural products, typically from the
Norman Kingdom in southern Italy and various city-states in southern Germany, the agoras in
Constantinople sold a richer variety that drew many merchants to supply wealthy Italian
aristocrats with the finest wines, olive oils, honey, etc.
While the abundant agricultural produce allowed the markets to generate wealth, state
intervention provided guidelines for several specialties of agriculture, meats, and fish. The Book
of the Eparch outlined laws surrounding the following specialties: grocers (σαλδαμάριοι),
butchers (μακελλάριοι), pork butchers (χοιρέμποροι), fishmongers (ίχθυοπράτάι), and bakers
(άρτοποιοί). Each specialty, despite heavy regulations, became extremely profitable and
contributed to the rise of Venetian merchants attempting to home in on these favorable markets.
The laws on grocers include:
§ I. Grocers may keep their shops throughout the city as well in the
squares as in the streets, so that the necessaries of life may be
easily procurable. They shall sell: meat (κρέας); salt fish (ίχθύας
τεταριχευμένους); meal (νεϋρον); cheese (τυρόν); honey (μέλι);
olive oil (έλαιον); vegetables of all kinds (όσπρίων πάν είδος);
butter (βοϋτυρον); dry and liquid resin (ξηράν πίσσαν καί ύγράν);
cedar oil (κεδρίαν); camphor (κανάβην); linseed oil (λινάριον);
gypsum (γύψον); earthenware (σκαϕίδια), bowls, vessels, etc.;
nails (καρϕία); bottles (βουττία); in fact every article which can be
sold by steelyards (καμπανοίς) and not by scales (μτί ξυγοίς). They
are forbidden to sell any article which comes within the trades of
perfumers, soap-chandlers, linen-drapers, taverners or butchers.
Any contravention is punished by flogging, shaving, and exile.
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§ III. Every grocer convicted of fraud in completing a sale or who
raises the agreed price, shall pay a fine of ten nomismata. Anyone
exposing his wares for sale on a Sunday or a feast day shall be
liable to the same penalty.
§ IV. Grocers are to watch over the special commodities of their
trade imported from abroad so that anyone, whether or not a
member of the guild, who hoards against a time of scarcity may be
denounced to the eparch and punished by him.
§ V. Grocers shall sell their wares and make a profit of two
miliaresia per nomisma. If their measures show that they have
exacted a greater profit they shall be flogged, shaved and cease to
trade as grocers.40
Section one’s acknowledgement shows not only what the grocers were legally permitted to sell,
but also the Byzantine Empire’s capacity for production. The economic advantages of the variety
of goods explains why the Italian states were drawn to Constantinople. Economic markets in
Venice, Genoa, and Pisa typically revolved around shipbuilding (primarily Venice), banking and
investment, arts and literature, and other services. By trading in Constantinople, the Italians
could use what little land they controlled to increase their financial infrastructure rather than on
animal husbandry and agriculture. It is clear that many goods in northern Italy did not originate
from there which shows the extent of the Byzantine’s economic power and influence in Italian
markets. Cedar oil, camphor, and linseed oil all most likely were imported goods that were sold
to the grocers in Constantinople as cedar oil, and specialized timbers were imported from Asia
Minor. Although the Byzantines controlled the western third of the region in the twelfth century,
the oils and timber were most likely from the Seljuk Turks or the remaining crusader kingdoms
in the Levant or Holy Lands. Camphor and linseed oil are found primarily in the Caucasus
regions and the greater Middle East, again suggesting that these items sold in the agoras were
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from expansive trade networks. Since the trade networks spanned three continents, it is
understandable that the Italian states would look to Constantinople to acquire these exotic goods.
Sections three through five further support the argument that the economic expansion
during the twelfth century provided Venetian merchants their profit-driven mentality. The Book
of the Eparch attempted to regulate the markets to prevent overseas merchants from acquiring
too much power in the city. By restricting profit margins on transactions, which the Italian
merchants had to obey while trading in the city, the Byzantine emperors attempted to prevent the
merchant class from both acquiring and maintaining economic control. The success of the
economy, coupled with the growing threat of Italian lust for profit, allowed Manuel I Komnenos
to loosen the enforcement of the laws regarding the grocers to ensure Byzantine shops stayed
competitive against the encroaching Italians.
Butchers and pork butchers were specifically distinguished through the sales and costs of
sheep and swine, respectively. The laws made it clear that the differences were to ensure that
purchasing of both meats remained competitive so that the sales price of both meats remained
low and allowed the consumer to acquire the meats which were considered a God-given right.
The laws on the butchers stated:
§ I. Butchers are forbidden to buy swine. They shall repair to the
“Strategion” (έυ τώ στρατεγίώ), with the knowledge of the eparch,
and having paid the tax of one gold nomisma they shall purchase
all the cattle indicated by his orders.
§ II. Butchers will buy according to the fixed tariff depending on
the quality of the cattle and sell accordingly. They shall slaughter
cattle and cut up one animal out of every lot in the presence of the
eparch. They may retain as their perquisite the head, feet, and
entrails of the slaughtered animals and shall sell the remainder at
the rate fixed according to the market purchase price.
§ V. Sheep owners shall sell their animals at the Strategion till the
first day of Lent (άποκρέας) and lambs at the market square
24

Tauros from Easter to Whitsunday, paying a tax of one gold
nomisma for sheep and a percentage thereof for lambs. Sheep and
lambs shall in the first place be marked and counted by the
eparch’s orders.41
The laws and regulations against the butcher show two things. First, it shows that the state
understood the importance of meats in the Greek diet, thus placing restrictions to ensure that
people had enough basic foods. Secondly, the issuance of meat taxes suggests that sheep and
lamb was a high commodities not just to Greeks, but to Europeans in general. By creating a price
floor for sales on sheep and lamb, stores were forced to sell to all economic classes in
Constantinople. Pork butchers faced similar regulations regarding fixed prices and taxes, but
there were two notable differences:
§ IV. Any pork butcher introducing his animals into the house of a
nobleman to sell them secretly shall be liable to the like
punishment (flogged, shaved and expelled from the guild).
§ V. Persons who slaughter swine and sell pork must not retain a
stock of it against times of scarcity. Anyone contravening this rule
shall be liable to the above-named penalties.42
The laws and regulations against pork butchers were more severe probably for two reasons. The
first is that pork was less abundant than mutton in the empire. This means that pork was likely an
imported meat from the regions north of Macedonia, as Islam forbids the consumption of pork.43
The second is the delicacy of pork in the Greek diet. If pork was primarily imported from eastern
Europe and the law explicitly stated that one shall not secretly sell pork in a house of a
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nobleman, then reason suggests that pork was either a delicacy to the Greeks or noble households
were hording the meat. The regulations against sheep, lamb, and pork offer further support to the
argument that the Byzantine administration was fearful of prices increasing. As previously
mentioned, the Byzantine nobles were reluctant to engage in trade and the growing wealth of the
merchants made the position of the nobles unstable. These laws and regulations were therefore
attempts to reduce the wealth and power of the merchants in Constantinople. Manuel I
Komnenos’ reforms strengthened the merchants by granting several rights and protections that
ensured Constantinopolitans would benefit from trading with the Italian states.
The last groups of agricultural and food-based shops in the agoras were those of the
fishmongers and bakers. The Aegean and Black Seas were rich in fish, allowing Greek Catholics
to diet according to papal doctrine, while non-Catholics could supplement their diets with fish.
Fishing was a large industry in the Byzantine Empire and given its historical significance to the
Greeks, the laws regarding fishing and the fish markets were relatively relaxed:
§ III. Fishmongers shall make their purchases on the sea beach or
the piers from fishing smacks at anchor. They shall not go directly
to the fishing grounds to buy on the high seas, but they shall wait
till the fishing smacks make fast ashore. Indeed, the sale of fish
shall not be made too much in retail. Their remuneration shall be
two follies per gold nomisma and the master of the guild shall
receive four follies.44
Since fish and fishing has always been a source of food for Europeans, little will be said about
the regulations of fishing and their impacts on Italian merchants in Constantinople. The
organization of the fish markets, which were located on the southern coast of Constantinople,
closest to the Byzantine agoras and furthest from the Italian quarters, points to the Byzantine
authorities protecting fishing from external trade. The regulations on the fisheries allowed the
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Byzantines to protect important markets from further Italian dilution. Perhaps the most
interesting series of laws and regulations were placed upon the bakers. Due to the nature of
baking breads, bakers had to follow strict, while sometimes protective, regulations:
§ II. Bakers are never to be liable to be called upon for any public
service, neither themselves nor their animals, to prevent any
hindrance to baking bread.
§ III. Bakers must not have their ovens under any dwelling-house;
and this rule is made because of the inflammable character of the
materials used. Moreover, private persons shall not keep their
stores of kindling wood and rushes (ϕρύγανον καί παπύρου ϋλην)
otherwise than in open places or in buildings built of large stones,
so as to prevent the risk of conflagrations in the city owing to the
inflammable character of the materials.
§ V. Let this important decree obtain universally. Persons who
contravene the following rules shall from this day forward, upon
conviction before the eparch of contravention, be flogged, shaved,
and perambulated through the city, and then exiled in perpetuity: I)
Any person attempting to raise the rent of a bakery, II) Anyone
coveting the wares of another trader who tries to reduce the price
thereof below the tariff value to get them at a cheaper rate, III)
Anyone following a trade who wishes to follow another trade and
refuses to elect to follow one or the other or to apply himself solely
to the trade of his choice.45
Bakers received a disproportionate number of protections granted by the Byzantine authority for
two reasons. First, the baker’s production of bread, another staple of Greek diet, was a difficult
and laborious task that, if derailed, could lead to catastrophic damage to the city. Due to the risk
of fire, the bakers most likely placed their shops away from the agoras, opting instead for
locations near the corn warehouses, or horrea, which were likely near the Harbor of Kaisarios or

45

“Bakers -- Άρτοποιοί,” Book of the Eparch, 42-3.
27

Theodosian Harbor.46 Further, due to the intense precision and training that bakers underwent,
their exemption from public service, most likely from military service, allowed the bakers to
continue selling their product without worry from Italian actions.
While the food-based sectors of the agoras were the most prominent in Constantinople,
they produced a minority of exported goods from the city. Despite this, their significance to the
trade wars in the twelfth century was profound. Many Greek foods were seen as a delicacy in
western Europe and, given the geographic proximity to Italy, were a high demand sector. The
various types of foods sold in the markets, which wealthy Italians sought as luxuries, increased
the Italians’ lust for profits. Since the Greeks were barred from raising the prices of these foods
to avoid impoverishing consumers, Italian merchants were able to buy large quantities of foods
at relatively low prices, after currency conversion. Merchants took the low-cost goods back to
Italy and sold them at incredible prices, creating hefty profits. This lust for wealth was evident
not only in the commerce of food commodities but also in the trade of other material items.
The first of these material items sold in the agoras was marble, whose quarries were in
great abundance throughout the Aegean Sea. Historically, marble quarries were found in nearly
every Greek island, but by the twelfth century marble had become scarce. However, the region of
Boeotia still produced an immense quantity of marble blocks and hard limestone at Hosios
Meletios, from which they were sent to Constantinople to be traded.47 Given the financial luxury
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of marble blocks and the scarcity of it, Italian merchants, many of whom worked for guilds
operated by nobles, saw it fit to purchase marble in large quantities. While Italian nobles used
marble to decorate their abodes, churches used marble as decoration around the altars. Thanks to
the demand for marble from the wealthy and the church in Italy, marble remained a consistent
commodity on the markets in Constantinople despite the decreased quantity being garnered.
Bricks were another important commodity in construction, and the manufacture of bricks
increased exponentially during the Komnenian dynasty in the twelfth century.48 The value of
brick and its popularity among the middle and lower classes allowed marble and limestone to
retain their luxury status and appreciated over time. It was during this period of artificially high
marble and limestone prices when Manuel I Komnenos was forced to create regulations that
prevented the sales of marble to foreign merchants, which angered the Italian states.
The industries of art, particularly metal-working, were another sector that saw growth
during the twelfth century as Italian merchants’ demand for icons grew. Since the Byzantine
coins were struck using gold, silver’s value declined and metal workshops began using silver as a
material to sculpt iconographic statues and small trinkets. Byzantine mints struck silver that
contained 1.5-10% copper to ensure the strength of the metal was formidable enough to craft
intricate items for buyers.49 The inclusion of copper not only ensured a strong metal, but also
further increased the price of the icons or trinkets, as the price of mixing both alloys increased as
proper proportions were calculated. The increase in cost for these items, which saw a high
demand in northern Italy, further contributed to the increased hostility by the Italian states. The
increased cost of manufacturing, shipping, and tariffs placed on exports, decreased the clientele
for those products to only the wealthiest of Italians.

48
49

Sodini, 140.
Anthony Cutler, “The Industries of Art,” in Economic History of Byzantium, ed. Angeliki Laiou, 157.
29

Glassmaking and pottery further expanded and complicated trade relations with the
Italian states. Glassmaking was considered a rarity, based on archaeological evidence that
concludes that glass products were luxury goods.50 Since glassmaking is a complicated and
delicate process, Emperor Constantine (r. 306 – 337) exempted glassmakers from paying taxes.51
The Book of the Eparch does not have any regulations establishing protections and laws on
glassmaking and Manuel I Komnenos never issued reforms on glassmaking, so it can be inferred
that they retained tax-exempt status throughout the twelfth century. As glass was a luxury good,
the only sustainable evidence of its transactions exists in three different markets: the church, the
aristocracy, and the scientific community. The use of stained glass in church mosaics suggests
that glassmakers were contracted by the diocese, specifically at the Church of the PantokratorZeyrek Camii from 1124-1136 and the monastery of Chora Kariye Camii in 1120.52 Aristocrats
and wealthy merchants also purchased glass-based products like “amulets of molded glass,
bracelets of spun glass, small jewels, and fake cameos.”53 While Byzantine aristocrats certainly
bought these products, they were also exported to Syria, Palestine, and the Italian states, showing
not only the empire’s extensive trade, but also the importance and value of Constantinople
glass.54 The scientific and academic community purchased glass tubes and cups for research
purposes (i.e., experimentation, chemistry, and other sciences). All three sectors ensured glass
production thrived during the twelfth century and influenced Italian materialistic ambitions.
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As with most ancient and medieval civilizations, pottery is the object found most often by
archaeologists, besides coins. Pottery has always been an indicator of a civilization’s wealth and
culture, and the Byzantine Empire was no different. Pottery was never considered a luxury, but
the abundance of pottery found suggests that the average Greek household’s purchasing power
increased throughout the twelfth century. Archaeological finds of pottery-based products -plates, bowls, cups, storage, cooking pots and pans, and tableware -- indicate increasingly
thriving urban classes.55 Byzantine red and white wares such as the sgraffito wares, were
commonly sold not just in the empire but also in Russia (the cities of Cherson, Kertch,
Tmutarakan, Sarkel, Novgorod, and Kiev)56 and in the gateway city of Zeugma that led into
Persia.57 Byzantine red and white wares were exported in large quantities because of the speed of
manufacturing which improved throughout the twelfth century and because of their durability
which improved with the use of a lead-based glaze to increase its strength.58 Pottery became a
highly sought commodity outside the empire, and the Italian states increased their purchasing of
pottery throughout the twelfth century. Pottery played an important role in trade wars and, as
with glass, the Book of the Eparch had no protections for the pottery guild. This made pottery
one of the significant sectors that the Venetians invested in to fight for economic control of
Constantinople.
The last commodity that will be discussed is perhaps the most significant in the
development of not only the Byzantine but also the Venetian economy – silk and the raw
material indigo. Silk and indigo were the most highly demanded product throughout northern
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Italy in the twelfth century as Venice’s wealth was built on them. Throughout the early Middle
Ages, Constantinople built its wealth primarily on silk, which was viewed as a status symbol.
Byzantine envoys would present silk clothes to European monarchs as gifts, thus increasing the
status of silk as a status of wealth.59 As much of Europe was still using woolen cloth for clothing,
silk was seen as an alternative fashion choice for the upper-class elites and nobles. Accordingly,
silk began to grow in popularity among the European elites, which increased the demand of silk
clothes from Constantinople. Silk is universally acknowledged as the primary industry in
Constantinople, and it drove the Byzantine economy for centuries. However, as Italian demands
for silk clothes increased in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, so did the need to ensure
protections and regulations for the silk guilds. The Book of the Eparch dedicated five chapters to
the various secondary sectors in the production of silk. Merchants of silk stuffs (Βεστιοπράται)
were considered the middle-men throughout the process of silk manufacturing. Of the several
laws that regulated and protected their field, only two are pertinent for this study. They stated:
§ IV. Any person who fails to inform the eparch of a sale of an
article destined for aliens of the Empire, so that the eparch may
certify (βουλλωθησομέη) the transaction, shall be held responsible.
§ VIII. Care must be taken to ensure that the strangers who lodge
in caravanserais do not purchase prohibited or unsewn garments,
unless for their personal use; and in the latter case the articles must
have been manufactured in Constantinople. When strangers leave
the city their departure must be notified to the eparch so that he
may take cognizance of the articles they have purchased. Anyone
helping them to evade this obligation shall be flogged, shaved, and
have his property confiscated.60
The protections and regulations indicate the seriousness of the Byzantine emperor’s desire to
protect the most valuable and highly sought-after industry in Constantinople. Section four shows
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that the empire deemed it necessary to track the sales of all silk items from leaving
Constantinople and targeted the attempts to smuggle the valuable silk from the empire to the
Italian states. This supports the eighth section which dictated the heavy regulation of silk
products and ensured that only approved sales of “silk stuffs” could be exported. These two laws
suggest that the illegal trade of silk, most likely by the Italian states (specifically Venice and
Genoa), hampered the Byzantine efforts to maintain the price of silk and the quantity available
for locals throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Raw silk merchants (Μεταξοπράαι), a
separate yet similar class of silk merchants, followed similar laws forbidding the sales of silk to
various entities. Despite the similarities, raw silk merchants differed in one important way from
merchants of silk products. The regulation in question states, “raw silk merchants are forbidden
to sell raw silk to Jews or to tradesfolk who would resell it outside the city. Persons contravening
will be flogged and shaved.”61 This difference is significant for two reasons. First, the antiSemitic law indicates a distrust of the Jewish neighborhood in Pera, north of the Golden Horn, to
conduct business effectively. Second, the law targets Venetian merchants from purchasing silk to
resell at a higher price back in northern Italy. This shows a growing distrust between the
Byzantine Empire and the Italian states well before the twelfth century, which later sparked
aggressive and hostile actions in the city regarding the purchase and resale of silk products.
Regulations concerning silk dyers (Σηρικάριοι) and their role in meeting Italian demands
for silk clothes and silk products help explain how the trade wars of the twelfth century created a
vile atmosphere that ended in military action in 1204. The laws pertaining to the silk dyers were
extremely specific, which suggests that the demand for indigo far exceeded Byzantine supply.
The law mandated:
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§ I. Dyers are forbidden to make up the purple of the so-called
prohibited grades, that is to say in the series of great mantles,
including those of self-color or those where the purple alternates
with dark green or yellow in half-tint. They may dye peach tint
where that color is combined with others, or common turbans of
Slavonian style slashed with scarlet bands. Peach-colored purple
and fine dresses of two palms’ length must be declared to the
eparch and also the cloaks worth more than ten nomismata, even if
of divers colors.
§ II. All noblemen and simple citizens are forbidden to make
cloaks of purple of six or eight lyes. This prohibition does not
extend to cloaks of ten or twelve lyes provided the tints are
unmixed purple and are of small type and such as would not come
within the category of dyed material which the eparch must reserve
for the use of the imperial house of the sovereign. And this
includes the cloaks rounded at the lower part reserved for the
prince’s use, excepting those of shorter model which fall in folds
on the tunic, counting at least ten lyes and colored in different tints.
Whoever is convicted of making articles which we forbid shall be
liable to have his goods confiscated and shall cease trading.
§ III. Whoever refuses to open his premises for inspection by the
inspector of seals or the inspector of cloths, or who sells to aliens
to the city a cloak worth more than ten nomismata shall be flogged
and shaved.
§IV. Whoever dyes raw silk with blood or converts it into particolored purple, double, triple, or two-thirds red, shall have his hand
cut off.
§ V. Whoever sells goods to aliens without the knowledge of the
eparch shall have his goods confiscated.
§ IX. Should bales of cloaks be found in the store-shops of the
dyers which do not bear the eparch’s stamp the same shall be
confiscated and the workman who had them shall have his goods
confiscated.62
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Silk dyers were heavily regulated because the silk in both the primary and secondary markets
was so valuable.63 Section one outlines the prohibition of the use of indigo on silk of a certain
grade unless indigo is mixed with certain other dyes. Indigo, since antiquity, was the symbol of
power for leaders (Roman emperors dressed in purple trabea which purportedly showed not only
their power as emperor, but their connection to the gods). As indigo was viewed as a symbol of
royal power in Europe, wealthy Italians demanded the indigo silks to display their own power.
Demand for indigo silks increased throughout the twelfth century influencing Venetian efforts to
control the manufacturing of the dye. Additionally, the high demand influenced regulations on
the quantity of indigo that could be used for each product as well as all companion colors
associated in the manufacturing process. This is important because as Venetian demand for
richer silk increased, the Byzantines were forced to innovate the manufacturing techniques that
reduced the quantity of indigo in each product while simultaneously increasing the richness of
lyeing the color. Lyeing, discussed in section two, involved the process of “immersing the
material or causing the coloring liquid to percolate through the silk tissues.”64 This preservation
by the Byzantines to withhold indigo from the Italian states eroded trade relationships and was
justification for Pisa and Genoa to raid Byzantine mercantile ships, stealing larger quantities of
indigo to meet the demands in Italy.
Section three outlined protections for the textile guilds to prevent illegal smuggling of
silks to foreign lands. The protections allowed guild members to regulate the sales of indigo silks
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and restricted members from profiting from silk. Again, these restrictions on price floors for the
silk industry were loosened during Manuel I Komnenos’ reforms to increase prices on silk and
indigo, suggesting that the Byzantines wanted to discourage Italian merchants from buying
them. Section four, the most severe of the laws on silk dyers, showed that false lyeing of silk was
a serious crime. The bastardization of indigo to accomplish sales by using blood as an alternative
to red dyes indicate that non-guild members attempted to increase their sales of indigo-based silk
by mixing blood to increase their profit margin. The last two sections were to combat the illegal
smuggling and “black market” sale of indigo and silk, which benefited the Italians. By protecting
the dyers’ businesses from underground markets, Constantinopolitans saw wages increase
throughout the twelfth century as business was directed towards legitimate channels, but also led
to a decrease in Italian lust for indigo and silk reduced.
The agoras of Constantinople saw a wealth of commodities and services that impacted
the city’s and empire’s economy. In the twelfth century, these markets flourished as laws
regarding the opening of businesses were eased to allow Byzantines a chance to increase their
standards of living, while supplying goods to overseas markets. However, due to Italian demand
for Byzantine and far Eastern goods in the city’s agoras, laws became more stringent to restrict
Italians from encroaching on various commercial sectors. Unfortunately for the Byzantines, these
laws did not establish the restrictions as they intended, and Venetian merchants flooded into the
city, establishing either strong majority shares or large minority shares in business sectors. It was
not until the reign of Manuel I Komnenos that Byzantine economic policy changed to bring back
majority ownership of markets to Byzantine businesses, to tax heavily foreign investments and
goods entering the city, and to return Constantinople to Byzantine economic control.

36

II.iv.

ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER MANUEL I KOMNENOS, 1143-1180 CE

Under Manuel I Komnenos, relations turned sour with Venice as the Byzantines
attempted three major economic reforms designed to weaken Venetian trading in Constantinople
and strengthen domestic output. These reforms were intended to further hinder Italian trading
because they not only relaxed several laws within the Book of the Eparch but also reorganized
Byzantine guilds and manufacturing sectors to prevent encroaching Venetian dominance. While
these reforms were met with hostility, they undoubtedly saved the markets from Venetian
control.
The first reform was the formation of guilds for most industries. Mandatory guild
organizations became commonplace, as many artisan shops began organizing to protect their
products.65 Previous to this reform, Leo VI the Wise regulated their profits, which suggests the
guilds were both non-mandatory and weak. True, the Book of the Eparch mandated the
organization of guilds for artisans and other vitally important industries in the Byzantine
economy, but this was not regularly enforced.66 Since non-guild members were able to run their
business relatively freely, Italian merchants managed to increase competition within those
markets. Prior to Manuel I Komnenos’ reforms, other emperors had allowed the creation of
voluntary associations (σωματεία) for non-guild members to try to organize the remaining
businesses, hoping to protect them from Italian encroachment.67 This attempt at voluntary
associations, however, actually created a worse situation for the local Byzantine economy for
two reasons. First, since these associations were voluntary, most businesses did not join to avoid
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paying a guild tax. Second, the association was organized and operated under the office of the
eparch, which was an elected position. There were situations in which the eparch, influenced by
Italian merchants, regulated local merchants more strictly while taking a laissez-faire approach to
the Italians. Under Manuel I Komnenos, the voluntary associations were absorbed into the guilds
and subject to the emperor. This action prevented Italians from increasing their presence in the
city and protected and expanded the output of goods from the guilds. It was this reform which
allowed Byzantine businesses to compete on an equal field with their Italian competitors. The
large-scale organization efforts by the Byzantine artisans caused friction with the Venetians who
now had to compete with strong organized guilds backed by the Byzantine government, rather
than with individual stores. Public sentiment against the Venetians pressured the Byzantine
Emperor to create the protective laws establishing the guilds.
Manuel I Komnenos’ second major economic reform to strengthen Byzantine merchants
was to issue new Chrysobulls with the Venetians and Pisans. Realizing the need for new reforms
that are not unilateral, Manuel forced the Italians into new contracts. These new Chrysobulls
were designed both to dissuade the Venetians from selling their goods in Constantinople (as new
regulations and paperwork were required with every transaction) and to increase Byzantine
profits from foreign markets. It further granted Venice a scala, or a port, connected to its trade
quarter.68 This was significant to Byzantine fish markets and exports for two reasons. First, the
Venetians were forced out of the same ports as Byzantine merchants, decreasing their ability to
intimidate local merchants. With the Venetians trading in the same ports, they could leverage the
imperial office to refuse paying tariffs and taxes upon arrival, while intimidating Byzantine
merchants by reducing prices and dissuading them from selling fish and other goods. As all
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Venetians were forced to relocate to the northern ports near their own trade quarter, so too did
their influence on Byzantine merchant’s ability to conduct trade. Second, the separation of
merchants allowed the empire to increase leverage on Venetian merchants. The imperial office
could now effectively retrieve payments from Venetian merchants systematically. The
Chrysobull regulated transactions by verifying every sale. The Venetians must ratify all sales and
deliveries with the imperial office in the city, which angered Venetian merchants as trade
became more expensive.69 The purpose of the paperwork was to introduce a new sales and
delivery tax on all Venetian goods to increase revenue and product costs at market as well as to
hinder Italian trade. This would discourage Byzantines from buying Venetian goods as their
retail prices increased, while domestic goods remained low. The new regulations were also
significant because the costs the imperial officials imposed on the paperwork also increased the
time spent on each transaction. By increasing the time for each transaction, the Byzantines were
able to control the speed at which Venetian merchants conducted business. Manuel’s blatant
hostility towards Venetian commerce, however, ultimately hurt Byzantine power, because after
the issuance of the new taxes and regulations, Venetian merchants began raiding ports
throughout the Aegean Sea, causing outrage among the Byzantine population.
Manuel I Komnenos also established laws regarding sanctions against the Venetians with
the Chrysobull of 1148, the text of which outlines the actions that constitute penalties and the
corresponding fines paid.70 This demonstrated the seriousness of the Chrysobull and its
restrictions on the Venetians. By calling for harsh sanctions on the Venetians, Manuel I
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Komnenos hoped to dissuade any wrongdoing towards the Venetians in the previous Chrysobulls
of his predecessors. Yet, the sanctions were met with open hostility in Venice, as piracy and
raiding throughout the Aegean Sea commenced following the ratification of the measure. These
raids further cemented Manuel I Komnenos’ disdain for Venice and incited him to enact harsher
penalties on Venetian merchants. He further reached out to the Venetian rival, the Republic of
Genoa, to open trade with them, hoping to cease hostilities in the region.71
The last major economic reform under Manuel I Komnenos that caused tensions, albeit
inadvertently, between the Venetians and Byzantines was the introduction of a Genoese trade
quarter in northeastern Constantinople. The Chrysobull of 1169, which established the Genoese
trade quarter in city, was a direct threat to the Venetian merchants. By granting the quarter, the
emperor effectively diluted the Venetian share of the market even further, as Venice had to
compete with the Pisan, Genoese, Amalfitan (a southern Italian city-state), and Byzantine
merchants. Continuing to weaken the Venetian quarter, Manuel I Komnenos granted several
exclusive rights to the Genoese, like full reimbursement on lost or sunken goods, reductive tax
laws, among others.72 These exclusive rights demonstrated the resolve of Manuel I Komnenos to
reduce the Venetian share of the Constantinople markets. Additionally, the rights provided to
Genoa (detailed more thoroughly in chapter three) were designed to subdue the Venetians and
prevent them from both overtaking market shares, as they had previously attempted, and to
ensure economic cooperation. Despite the ongoing battles between the Venetian and Byzantine
governments, Constantinople still needed the Venetian market, as two centuries of trade with
Venice solidified a consumer base for Byzantine goods.
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Within two years of the establishment of the Genoese quarter, Venetian merchants
organized with the Pisans and destroyed it. This was most likely due to the hatred the Venetians
had against Manuel I Komnenos for welcoming the Genoese into the city and providing them
with exclusive rights. The destruction of the quarter allowed the emperor to take unprecedented
action. Furious, Manuel I Komnenos banished the Pisans from their own trade quarter in
Constantinople and relocated them to the neighborhoods of Pera and Scutari across the Golden
Horn.73 As Pisan merchants were effectively puppets for the Venetians in the late twelfth
century, any disruption to them would cause a recession in the Venetian markets. Emperor
Manuel I Komnenos’ actions after the burning of the Genoese quarter caused financial
restrictions for Venetian merchants and the Pisan economy, and essentially ruined any chance of
Italian reconciliation. The significance of Manuel I Komnenos’ attempts to add Genoa to the list
of Italian trade partners forced Venetian shares to diminish. Further, the relocation of the Pisan
quarter prevented Venetian merchants from dominating markets. The establishment of the
Genoese trade quarter by Manuel I Komnenos caused tensions between the Venetians and
Byzantines to erupt into violence, causing significant retaliation efforts by the emperor.
After the three major economic reforms under Manuel I Komnenos, public sentiment in
Constantinople became increasingly violent, a direct change in attitudes towards the Venetians.
By 1170, Constantinopolitans and other Greeks throughout the Aegean Sea changed their
attitudes towards the Venetians. Initially jubilant at having a new commercial partner, Venice in
992 and again with Pisa in 1111, Greeks changed towards open hostility during the latter half of
Manuel I Komnenos’ reign. Writing shortly after the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, Niketas
Choniates openly criticized the Venetian’s in the Byzantine Empire by likening them to pack of
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animals flocking to the city.74 By comparing the Venetian peoples to barbaric clans, swarming in
flocks, Niketas dehumanizes the Venetians, showing this dramatic change in the attitudes of the
Byzantines from jubilance to revulsion. This sentiment was evident throughout the Byzantine
Empire and helped influence Manuel I Komnenos’ actions against the Venetians. Relations
collapsed after the Massacre of the Latins which saw the systematic arrest of all Latins in the
empire along with all Italian assets seized. Niketas Choniates wrote how the surviving Venetians
within Constantinople fled on a ship and sailed back to Venice. He writes, “Unfurling the sails,
they returned home thanks to the winds. Fire-bearing ships and imperial triremes filled with men
carrying one-edged axes on their shoulders pursued them closely.”75 This open hostility towards
retreating civilians demonstrated the violent attitudes of the Byzantines against Venetians at the
end of the twelfth century. Byzantine public sentiment against the Venetians was extremely
hostile and created the conditions for the Venetians to gather support to declare war on the
Byzantines.
The death of Manuel I Komnenos enraged the Byzantines who channeled their anger
against the Italians and created a situation that the Venetians used to declare war.76 Incited by the
Byzantine usurper, Andronikos Komnenos (r. 1183-85), the Greeks were encouraged to seek
revenge on the Italians for a century of unfair economic practices. Greek mobs organized in
Constantinople and began attacking the Italian quarters. Since the Pisan quarter was relocated to
the suburbs, it did not bear much damage, but the Genoese and Venetian quarters were
destroyed. While most of the 60,000 Italians fled the city, roughly ten thousand Italians perished
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in the massacre. This widespread massacre of western peoples was significant for two reasons in
understanding why the Venetians retaliated in 1204. First, the massacre was caused by Greek
hysteria influenced by the anti-Italian rhetoric preached by Andronikos Komnenos during his
coup. Despite the rhetoric’s blatant call for the murder of the Latins, not even the Komnenos
family, including Andronikos, realized the full effect of the Greek people’s actions. The
massacre gave the Venetians the final justification for a military campaign against the Byzantine
Empire. The murder of thousands of Italians was viewed as a preemptive attack on the Italian
city-states. This event created the conditions necessary for the Venetians to gather support from
the Pisans and Genoese to declare war on the Byzantine Empire.
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III.

THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE

Before the Chrysobull of 1082 was signed, Venice had already shared a history with the
Empire. As the tenth province of Roman Italy under Augustus, Venetia et Istria found itself
under multiple kingdoms throughout the fifth century until the province was finally absorbed by
the Byzantines in the late-sixth century when Ravenna became the regional capital.77 Venice’s
relations with Constantinople slowly deteriorated beginning with the reign of the Galbaii family
(r. 764-804) under Doge Maurizio Galbaio. Since the Venetian province was far removed from
the Byzantine Empire’s capital, and thus outside the emperor’s political interest, Venice sought
separation. According to the writer John the Deacon (940-1009), Doge Pietro Tribuno (r. 887912) successfully completed the severance of Venice from the Byzantines.78 While they wanted
independent rule, Venetian leaders understood that to ensure continued economic growth, they
needed to maintain financial relations with Constantinople.
This desire for continued economic growth led to the first official Chrysobull between
the Byzantines and Venice in 992. Under the leadership of Doge Pietro II Orseolo (r.991-1009)
and co-Emperors Basil II (r. 976-1025) and Constantine VIII (r. 962-1025), the normalization of
economic relations were solidified. The three leaders understood the importance of economic
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development in the long-term and agreed to provide favorable conditions to the Venetians. The
Chrysobull declared, in part:
Therefore we order and we mandate that those who serve in the
office of the Eparch . . . and all of those persons falling under the
imperial service until the lower services, yet that of the public, and
also no other person has the license at any time throughout any
occasion of whatever kind to touch, search or investigate any man
of these Venetians or any of their boats or to inquire them on any
occasion of whatever kind.79
The Chrysobull of 992 had two important implications that would drive the Venetians in a more
hostile direction against the Byzantines in the twelfth century. First, the Chrysobull allowed no
member under the management of the eparch to investigate and manage incoming Venetian
maritime goods. The only individual who could examine the cargo from the Venetian ships was
the Logothetes tou Dromou.80 By granting only one individual in the Byzantine administration
the power to inspect goods arriving on Venetian ships, the Byzantine government effectively
allowed Venetians to enter the city without any regulations and custom taxes and tariffs that the
other departments under the Eparch managed. The second issue was that the refusal to impose
taxes and tariffs on goods would create the foundation for the political arguments in the twelfth
century about Venetians’ economic privileges in Constantinople. When the Byzantines attempted
to increase the taxes and tariffs in the twelfth century, Venetian merchants, spoiled by earlier
Chrysobulls, were not willing to give up their economic privileges and fought aggressively to
maintain them.
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III.i.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE

In contrast to the Pisans and Genoese, the Republic of Venice benefited from closer
geographic proximity to Constantinople. Venice, located on the northwestern side of the Italian
peninsula, already controlled maritime trade in the Adriatic Sea by the beginning of the twelfth
century. Given the geographic situation in northern Italy, the Venetians needed to find new ways
to support their economy. Given its proximity to the Aegean Sea and the larger eastern
Mediterranean, Venice sought expansion. The Adriatic’s gateway into the Mediterranean is only
72 miles wide stretching from Apulia to Albania.81 With its strong navy, Venice was able to
control this rather narrow strait but had to deal with problems stemming from the Adriatic winds.
Three main wind patterns; the bora, the maestral, and the sirocco were extremely dangerous for
navigation between November and February, which prevented long-term maritime shipping
within the Adriatic and shortened the sailing season.82 The Venetians determined the best way to
counter the winter winds was to establish a series of colonies along the Adriatic coastline, thus
allowing mercantile vessels to move slowly and safely through the sea and not risk sinking due
to the unpredictable wind patterns. By establishing these colonies, the Venetians could increase
the sailing season year-round and not have to risk an economic contraction during the winter
months.
The expansion of the Republic of Venice along the eastern Adriatic also had an important
economic purpose to its expansionist plans. As the three wind patterns were easterly, the Italian
coastline proved inoperable for ships, whereas Dalmatia, with its numerous islands, provided a
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refuge for ships attempting to escape storms, pirates, or foreign ships.83 Therefore, the Venetians
constructed several cities and fortresses in these island chains to provide safe passage throughout
the Adriatic. The new cities and fortresses served as a military buffer and allowed the navy to
respond quickly to any hostile threat. Secondly, the cities allowed Venice to expand its
population outside the geographic confines of the capital. Together, the Adriatic Sea’s
geographic importance was crucial to the economic expansion of the Venetians throughout the
eleventh and twelfth centuries – in short, the Adriatic Sea was key to the Republic of Venice’s
economic expansion.
The city of Venice is on a cluster of small islands connected to the mainland, which
prevented the Venetians from having a strong agricultural economy that was common in
medieval Europe. Instead, the Venetians relied primarily on banking, investment, and trade. The
city’s urban layout, which did not have many markets, allowed for the increase in banks, mints,
and other financial institutions. As the wealth of Venice grew and the reliability of the financial
institutions increased, Venetian Doges sought to expand and diversify the republic’s economy.
During the eleventh century, Venice expanded its territory along the northern shores of the
Adriatic, which provided land to increase agricultural output. However, because the Venetian
economy still relied heavily on finances and trade, political administrations spent more time
gaining trade privileges with the Byzantines than diversifying their economy.
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III.ii. VENETIAN-BYZANTINE RELATIONS, 1098-1192

Extensive trade between Venice and Byzantium began with the Chrysobull of 1082 as
part of efforts by the Republic and the Empire to expand economic opportunities. The
Chrysobull was signed after the Venetians accepted a Byzantine request for military assistance in
defeating the Norman Kingdom in southern Italy and Sicily. As Venetians wanted the
southeastern Italian shoreline to control the entire Adriatic and protect maritime shipping lanes,
they quickly agreed. Thankful for the help, Byzantium granted a new Chrysobull to Venice.
Officially granted by Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081-1118), first ruler of the Komnenian dynasty,
the trade deal established a commercial quarter in Constantinople for Venetian merchants, free
market trade, and other generous privileges.84 This decree began the pursuit of the Venetians and
of other Italian states to pursue aggressive trade policy in Constantinople. The development of
the new trade quarter in the rundown neighborhoods along the Golden Horn began construction
immediately.85 The buildings were remodeled to fit the commercial and residential needs of the
merchants. The location, at first glance, was ideal for Venice as its location across the Golden
Horn from Pera allowed a steady stream of consumers. Further, the quarter was, at least initially,
close enough to the metal works and several agoras to ensure a persistent and thriving trade in
the city. The most important note about the Chrysobull of 1082 was the exclusion of an
independent landing-stage for Venice. This had two practical effects. First, it meant that the
Venetians, like other merchants trading in the city, had to pay tariffs on all imported goods.
Second, it prevented the Byzantines from losing a harbor, and as such, losing revenue from the
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tariffs imposed on the merchants. However, the Chrysobull protected Venetian merchants,
unlike the Arab merchants, from potential aggressors. The statute specified:
Allowing, then these grants, our pious Majesty ordered and
commanded that nobody is to oppose them since they are honest
and true servants of our Clemency and assistants against the enemy
and have promised that they will continue to be so till the end of
time; and absolutely nobody is to entertain hostile feelings towards
them or exercise any allegations against them because of what has
been conferred to them, namely the workshops and landing-stages
(scalai).86
The protective measure ensured that the Byzantine population should in no way harm the
Venetian merchants as they were considered faithful servants of the Emperor of Byzantium.87
The term “faithful servants” is in reference to their agreement to help defeat the Norman
Kingdom; by no means were they literally servants of Byzantium. These protections allowed
Venetian merchants to establish strong commercial dominance in the early twelfth century.
Initially beneficial for the Italians, these protections created the foundations for the financial
disasters a century later. The economic consequences that arose from the creation of the
Venetian quarter foreshadowed the commercial hostility in the eastern Mediterranean during the
latter half of the twelfth century.
The Chrysobull of 1082 also imposed sanctions on those who would do harm to the
Venetian quarter, the merchants, or the merchant goods. These sanctions emboldened Venetian
merchants and created financial instability to the Byzantine economy when enforced. The most
important sanction mandated:
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If anyone in particular infringes anything that is ordained in this
Chrysobull, he will be scorned, he will be forced irretrievably by
the Sekreton of the epi ton oikeiakon to pay 10 librae of gold, and
from which there will be payment to them [the Venetians] the
worth that has been taken away in fourfold.88
The repayment that Venetian merchants were entitled to from the destruction of goods caused by
Constantinopolitans was too extreme. While it can be argued that the purpose was to deter doing
harm to the Venetians, in practice the financial cost of repayment on a large scale was
detrimental to the economy. Venetian merchants were encouraged because the sanction did not
specify the extent of damage. Which suggests that if Venetian merchandise was dropped upon
inspection or otherwise damaged, the incident could have bankrupted the average
Constantinopolitan. While this may seem trivial and have no purpose in the broader argument,
the financial cost incurred by the Byzantines after the Byzantine-Venetian War (1171-2) and the
Massacre of the Latins (1182) financially strained the local economy and forced the Byzantines
to capitulate to the demands of the Venetians. These demands allowed the Venetian merchants,
who over time became increasingly employed by the aristocracy in Venice, propelled them into
acquiring large minorities in several sectors of the Byzantine economy and eventually, after the
Byzantine-Venetian War, a majority share in maritime trade.
For the next thirty years, the Venetian trade quarter flourished and benefited from trade
deals and the access to the many commercial markets throughout the city. This nearly unimpeded
access allowed Venetians merchants and aristocrats to invest substantially in several fields,
primarily those of silk, dyes (almost exclusively indigo), glass, and banking/finance. Venetian
access to the Fora of Amastrianus and the Theodosian Forum was essential for Venetian
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merchants to compete with the other Italian states, who began to trickle into the city to secure
minority shares of various industries in competition with the Venetians.89 Both locations offered
abundant markets for meat, fish, and grain, necessities for feeding the Venetian quarter in the
city and their satellite quarters throughout Greece. The market’s western location in the city
allowed Venetian merchants to bypass the crowded Strategion market where Pisa and Genoa
were slowly increasing their footprint until their quarters were established in 1111 and 1169,
respectively. Furthermore, the areas surrounding these two markets consisted of numerous
materialistic goods specializing in the sales of anything from oils, spices, and wines to glass,
honey, and pottery.90 The plethora of stores helped cement Venetian economic dominance in the
city because the Venetians forced Byzantine shops to close. The arrival of the Pisan merchants to
the city and lack of significant reforms in the early-twelfth century by the Byzantine emperors
further exacerbating Venetian dominance.
In 1119 the Venetians elected a new Doge, Domenico Michiel (r. 1119-1130), whose
main priority was to renegotiate the previous deal made by Alexios I Komnenos. As Alexios I
passed and his heir, John II Komnenos (r. 1118-1143), balked at renegotiations, tensions began
to mount and Byzantine attitudes began to shift against the Venetians. The emperor refused to
renegotiate because he understood the previous deal to be both suitable and fair because, like
previous Chrysobulls, it granted the Venetians immovable property rights and widespread
financial protections on their goods.91 Immovable property was important to long-term trade
relations, because it assured a permanent trade partner and reduced the hassle of continuous

Mango, “Commercial Map,” 198-9.
Mango, “Commercial Map,” 200-1.
91
Penna, 35.
89
90

51

negotiations over land for the foreign merchants.92 After John II Komnenos refused the new deal
in 1119, Doge Domenico Michiel, angered by the refusal, ordered attacks on the Aegean ports of
Rhodes, Lesbos, and Kephalonia. As the Venetian navy proved too powerful to stop, John II
Komnenos was forced to capitulate and renegotiated the Chrysobull, granting two primary deals.
First, he enforced the previous Chrysobull, specifically the granting of merchant trading in the
agoras. Second, he granted Venice more trade privileges, including an exemption to pay a
custom tax and free trade for Venetian merchants in Crete and Cyprus.93 While this new
Chrysobull was an extension of Alexios’ deal, its significance was twofold. First, the revisions
reduced total tax expenditures for Venetian merchants, directly supporting the monopolization of
Venetian businesses in several important sectors in Constantinople. Second, the Chrysobull was
signed 15 years after Pisa’s Chrysobull, demonstrating Venetian attempts to control all trade with
Byzantium. Pisan emergence angered the Venetians as it was seen as a method to dilute the
Venetian share of the Constantinople markets. These issues caused the Venetians to find new
ways to control market shares and suppress competition in the city.
Venetian hostility continued with the increase in trade activity among the Pisans, forcing
the Byzantines to sign another Chrysobull to avoid the ire of the Venetian merchants, who
wanted to retain their superiority in the city. The root of the hostility can be traced to the Pisan
Chrysobull of 1111, which granted Pisa a scala next to the northern ports and waived all custom
taxes on imported goods. Venice, on the other hand, was not granted a scala until 1147. The
Chrysobull of 1147 did not explicitly grant economic benefits to the Venetians, but they did
create a foundation for the Chrysobull of 1148. Since the Venetians helped defeat King Roger II
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of Sicily (r. 1130-1154), Emperor Manuel I Komnenos granted additional trade privileges to
Venetian merchants. In addition to continued access to free trade in Cyprus and Crete, the
Venetians finally acquired their own scala. The Chrysobull stated:
Our Imperial Majesty bestows on [the Venetians] by the present
Chrysobull what they requested, the houses and free places and the
landing stage, which is expressed to be counted and to be written
down in this, praktikon of corporal delivery of them, this command
is to be done by the desimotatos Epyphanio Tuglica, which should
be certified by the superscription of the intimacy of our Majesty,
John Pepagomenos and has to be registered at the appropriate
sekreta, an among them our Highness should register this
Chrysobull.94
The Chrysobull of 1148 was a Venetian victory. The merchants finally acquired the scala after
thirty years of continued mercantile raiding and open hostilities with Pisan and Byzantine
shipping. Additionally, the Chrysobull granted more immovable property rights and increased
the size of the Venetian quarter, as more Italian merchants flooded into the city to take part in the
thriving trades. This increase included the establishment of Venetian courts and new Venetian
markets that encroached upon Byzantine shops and warehouses. The Venetian courts allowed all
criminal cases and civil and economic disputes to be prosecuted under Venetian law rather than
Byzantine law. However, despite the victory for Venetian merchants, the Chrysobull still
restricted trade. As the treaty was written after Venetian raids on Greek islands, the Byzantines
included stricter documentation of Venetian sales of goods and services. Imperial offices were
tasked with verifying all Venetian transactions and ledgers on all goods imported to the city,
which were then submitted to the Constantinople treasury for the purpose of documenting
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Venetian activity.95 The strict documentation of Venetian goods could be a result of the
Byzantines cracking down on Venetian monopolization efforts in targeted sectors of the
economy. By recording all transactions, the Eparch could submit quantitative reports to the
imperial court, helping the emperor understand the state of the city’s economy. In turn, the
emperor issued protectionary laws for the private guilds throughout the city, as noted previously.
The Venetian demands imposed upon the Byzantines allowed Venice to acquire more trade
privileges, expand their trade quarter, and decrease competition. They gave the Byzantines a
foundation upon which they could reform their economy to dissuade Venetian merchants from
investing in the city, increase local businesses, and reestablish Byzantine economic majority in
Constantinople.
Following the death of Manuel I Komnenos and the political coup by the Angelos
dynasty, Isaac II Angelos sought to repair trade relations that Manuel I Komnenos destroyed.
Isaac II granted five privilege acts starting in 1187. The first three Chrysobulls were granted in
1187 and were titled: 1) Privilegium Ysaakii Constantinopolitani Imperatoris, 2) Privilegium
Confirmationis de Concessione Imperatoris Constantinopolitani, and 3) Privilegium Ysachii
Imperatoris Romanorum.96 These Chrysobulls restored all previous privileges that the Venetians
had in Constantinople including the return of the Venetian trade quarter that was sacked by the
Constantinopolitans. To the great anger and dismay of the Byzantine population, it also returned
all seized assets under Venetian control, stating:
[the emperor] allows by his own Chrysobull…that [the Venetians]
have all the districts which they had at the time of the everlasting
memorable emperor and uncle of my Majesty Manuel Komnenos
and were taken, and also that all their goods will be returned to the
Venetians which were held in palaces and monasteries or that had
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been transferred to the imperial vestiary or any other place,
whether proved in writing or not.97
Again, this was a Venetian victory and a Byzantine defeat. Venetian merchants were allowed to
resume their economic monopolization of Constantinopolitan commerce which only benefited
Venice. The return towards Italian dominance was an indicator that any Byzantine actions
against the Venetians would result in war. Further, the Venetian return signaled to the Pisans,
who were effectively puppets for the Venetian quarter, and the Genoese that they were no longer
able to compete against the Venetian merchants in the city.
Two years later in 1189, Isaac II Angelos finalized the remaining two (the fourth and
fifth) Chrysobulls to the Venetians. While the fourth has not been preserved, the fifth was. The
Venetian version of the fifth Chrysobull is titled, Privilegium Isaachii Imperatoris
Constantinopolitani,98 and provided the last series of economic privileges to the Venetians.99
This last document, primarily consisting of legal matters, does have one clause that is
noteworthy:
The emperor allows the Venetians to receive the income of these
[of the emboloi and of the scalai], while said Venetians should not
undergo any kind of disturbance from the fiscus or from any of the
person’s to whom they now belong and from whom they will be
taken when they are given to them.100
The protection of income from items originally confiscated a decade prior were guaranteed by
Isaac II, which further shows the Venetians’ success in pressuring the Byzantines to pay
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reparations for all goods confiscated. Venetian power in Constantinople was actually displayed
in all five Chrysobulls. Because the Venetians could afford to establish monopolies in several
important sectors, their presence was needed to support the Byzantine economy. After the
Massacre of the Latins and the declaration by Manuel I Komnenos to seize all Venetian property
in Greece, the Byzantine economy faltered. It was this downturn that allowed the Venetians to
return and receive the restoration of economic privileges resumed.
For the Byzantines, the betrayal of Isaac II Angelos was not supported by the population.
Under Manuel I Komnenos, Byzantine merchants and business owners were growing in the city
and it appeared as if they might retake majorities in all major economic sectors. With the
Angelos coup and the restoration of commercial privileges by Isaac II, Byzantine growth
reversed. Venetian-Byzantine political and civil relations under the Komnenos dynasty were
initially joyous and welcoming but turned vile and rotten by the time Manuel I Komnenos died.
After the Angelos coup, political relations improved yet were still fragile, but civil relations grew
worse. Civic unrest and open hostilities against the Italians, primarily the Venetians, continued
throughout the late-twelfth and into the thirteenth century.

III.iii. ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER DOGE ENRICO DANDOLO, 1192-1205

By 1192 Venice had become the premier economic power in Europe. The restoration of
economic privileges in Constantinople following the death of Manuel I Komnenos proved costly
to the Byzantines. Now unmatched, the republic dominated Italian commerce. Venice’s naval
strength in the Adriatic was envied by many, its banking system venerated by all Europeans, and
its political ruthlessness studied by future kings. In Constantinople, Venetian merchants ruled the
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agoras while systematically strengthening their political power in Byzantium. Greek merchants
worked at the whims and wishes of the Venetians merchants. Despite the stalwart Venice had
become, upon further inspection, cracks appeared that threatened its supremacy. Of these, the
persistence of the Veronese Penny in northern Italy, discussed below, and the constant hostility
of the Greeks towards the Venetians, showed the potential for a cataclysmic clash between the
Venetians and Byzantines.
In 1192 the Venetian aristocracy elected Enrico Dandolo, a prominent and ruthless
businessman, as Doge of Venice.101 His first economic action was to reconfigure Venetian
coinage to exert total control of Constantinople and also of northern Italy. At the time of his
election, the Veronese Penny was the primary currency of northern Italy and was widely
accepted and even preferred in Byzantium. This was made possible by the actions of Doge
Dandolo’s predecessors, Vitale Michiel II (r. 1156-72) and Orio Malipiero (1178-92), who
oversaw the reduction of Venetian minting after Doge Ordelafo Faliero de Doni (r. 1102-17) sold
the mint lands to a private investor.102 The mint lands were rich in gold and silver deposits,
meaning that the Venetian mint saw a substantial decrease in coin output and thus circulation in
the city. When coupled with the Byzantine currency reforms that introduced the hyperpyron as
the Greek standard, Venetian banks were teetering on bankruptcy. Doge Dandolo’s mission was
simple; devalue the Byzantine hyperpyron and standardize a new Venetian currency, the Grosso.
This would allow the Venetians to strengthen their markets domestically and, simultaneously, to
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continue their control of the Constantinopolitan markets. This attempt would later be used to
justify military action against the Byzantines.
The problem for Venetian merchants was that there was not a universal coin among the
Italian states, as the mints of Milan, Pavia, Verona, Pisa, and Lucca were accepted throughout
the peninsula, creating a complex exchange market that hampered fast trade.103 As the previous
Venetian coins held only half the value of the Veronese, the Venetians were more inclined to use
the Veronese Denarii.104 Furthermore, the Venetian currency was entirely dependent on the
Veronese Denarii so when the coin was devalued in 1180, the Venetian penny was threatened.
Doge Dandolo acted quickly, seeking to base the grosso on the Carolingian model of weight,
where one pound of gold equaled either 20 shillings or 240 pennies, which were issued in
silver.105 The weight of the coins was significant because it established a strong currency
exchange rate that was both competitive and resistant to inflation and because their value
strengthened by reducing the amount of gold in the grosso and mixing the coins with silver and
copper. While this may seem counterintuitive, the purpose was to base the value of the coins not
on the quantity of gold in them, but rather base the worth on established by the government.106
The Carolingian model was becoming the standard for new coins in Italy, causing the Italian
states to circulate new coins. Making matters worse for the Venetian merchants, during this
period of devaluation and new minting, they relied on the circulation of coins in Byzantium and
the Kingdom of Jerusalem.107 As Islamic forces made gains in the Holy Lands threatening the
existence of the kingdom, Venetian merchants, too, feared the possibility of recession. These
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events created panic among the bankers in Venice and forced Dandolo to circulate the new
currency quickly.
The lighter coins were significantly more popular than the hyperpyron because the
stylistic model favored accessibility and portability. While the coins were modeled after the
weight of the Carolingian models, their physical appearance was modeled after the Byzantine
nomisma (devalued in 1080).108 The grosso was struck like modern coinage, circular, with the
face of the Doge in the center and text along the edges, unlike the hyperpyron that was cupshaped.109 This difference immediately made the new coins more popular in Constantinople for
two reasons. First, the coins’ dramatic weight difference allowed more coins to be carried by
each person, which impacted the quantity of goods one could purchase at a given time. Second,
the physical design of the hyperpyron made it difficult to carry, as the cup-shaped coins were
cumbersome. The Venetian grosso, reflecting the Byzantine nomisma, allowed the coins to be
easier to store and transport. Additionally, because the nomisma was popular among the
Constantinopolitans, the grosso struck a familiar feeling which allowed it to circulate more in the
Greek islands. Despite the popularity, the Byzantine administration in Constantinople refused to
allow its circulation, as their attempts to maintain economic independence from Venetian control
increased.
As the Byzantines continued to restrict Venetians goods in Constantinople, Doge
Dandolo retaliated similarly. On August 16, 1192, he expelled all foreigners living within
Venice’s lagoon who had taken up residence after 1190.110 Additionally, the decree forbade any
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lending of money to foreigners for more than fifteen days.111 While the decree’s reasoning is
unknown to scholars, it can be inferred that it sought to halt the growing population of Greek
residents in the city. Doge Dandolo’s political involvement prior to his Dogeship was heavily
interwoven with actions directed at the Byzantines. He was involved in military action during the
Byzantine-Venetian War of 1171 and was named Ducal Legate in 1183 during the negotiations
to restore the economic rights following the Massacre of the Latins the previous year.112 His
previous interactions with the Byzantines appear to have been only during periods of war and
violence, imprinting a spitefulness against the Greeks. That could be why the decree in August of
1192 was directed at the foreigners within Venice.
While Doge Enrico Dandolo’s economic reforms certainly helped in maintaining the
power of Venice, the results had a direct impact on Venice’s adversaries. The restructuring of the
Venetian coins fixed the problem that plagued their coins throughout the twelfth century
following the horrendous land grant. The new Venetian grosso dominated the markets in
northern Italy immediately upon its circulation. However, the Byzantine State’s refusal to accept
the new currency forced Dandolo into negotiations. As retaliation, perhaps not just because of
the refusal of a new coin, the Doge expelled all foreigners from Venice and restricted moneylending. Unfortunately for Doge Dandolo, these efforts only strengthened the resolve of the
Byzantines to refuse Venetian influence. The actions by the Byzantines finally provoked the
Doge, whose long political history with the Greeks was immensely biased, to prepare plans for
the conquest of Constantinople.
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IV.

THE REPUBLICS OF PISA AND GENOA

As historical rivals of Venice, the Republics of Pisa and Genoa emerged from the early
Middle Ages as economic competitors against their eastern Italian adversary. The Republic of
Genoa was granted legal freedoms by Berengar II of Italy (r. 950-61) in 958 but did not
experience the immediate rise of power as its Tuscan neighbor did.113 Instead Genoa built its
wealth slowly, an apparent means to ensure a strong legal foundation for economic activity. The
Republic of Pisa established its sovereignty in 1000 and only a few years later, in 1005, became
an influential economic force following the sack of Reggio di Calabria: Pisa became a political
power a decade later with the conquest of Sardinia in 1016 as a part of a joint-attack with Genoa
against Muslim pirates.114 What appeared as a strong alliance between the Pisans and Genoese
quickly collapsed. Despite their joint operation against the Muslims, certainly the only reason to
set aside political differences during this period, the fragile relationship shattered shortly
afterwards causing both republics to compete for economic supremacy. This competitive
behavior among the small republics hurled them into complex alliances, violent betrayal, and
aggressive piracy operations in the Aegean Sea.
During the twelfth century, Pisa’s wealth increased as part of its ongoing commercial
competition with Genoa and Venice. Its most notable achievement was the construction of the
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Tower of Pisa, which showcased its wealth and power. It should be noted that Pisa, like Genoa,
had multiple overseas economic outposts and their merchants traveled throughout Europe. This
vast trade network allowed Pisa and Genoa to construct magnificent buildings and generate
wealth among their subjects. Despite their strong economic influence overseas, Pisan merchants
had little power in Constantinople. The merchants’ struggle with other Italian states throughout
the Mediterranean shaped Pisan responses to the economic opportunities in the city of
Constantinople. The Republic of Genoa, however, used its established economic practices that
were cultivated through trade with the western European kingdoms to significantly disrupt
Venetian control of the Constantinople markets. Yet, the Genoese would not arrive in the city
until fifty years after the Pisans. Both republics influenced Venetian aggression towards the
Byzantines and helped persuade the Venetian Doge to reroute the crusading forces to
Constantinople.

IV.i.

THE REPUBLIC OF PISA

During the twelfth century, the Republic of Pisa dominated as an economic city-state.
Located on the western side of the Italian peninsula, Pisa acquired a large sphere of economic
influence.115 Pisa’s geographic location was not advantageous for commerce because the city
was far removed from the thriving empires along the eastern Mediterranean. To combat this
growing challenge, the Pisan government began rapidly expanding its control over territories in
Corsica, Sardinia, Carthage, and various cities along the southwestern coast of Italy between
1130 and 1150. By directly controlling these territories, Pisa secured mercantile shipping routes
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along the entire western coast of Italy. Its dominance along the central Mediterranean coastlines
allowed the Pisan military the finances needed to build and support a large naval armada. This
naval force would become instrumental in the protection of Pisan mercantile shipping against the
harassment by Genoese ships throughout the Aegean Sea.
As Venice was beginning to dominate the Byzantine markets, Alexios I Komnenos
needed to circumvent the economic takeover. His response was finding a new trade partner,
specifically one that had longstanding trade disputes with Venice and understood its methods.
After searching for years, the Byzantines formally signed a Chrysobull with Pisa. The
Chrysobull of 1111 granted the Pisans rights similar to the Venetians which ensured equal
commercial rights to decrease Venetian control. The only notable difference between the Pisan
and Venetian Chrysobulls was that the Pisans were given a landing-stage (scala) along the
Golden Horn.116 Pisa was also given exemptions on taxes paid on bullion imported to the empire
and a reduction in taxes on imports brought from foreign countries from ten to four percent, but
was still required to pay the Kommerkion, the full amount (most likely ten percent) on exports
from the city.117 The scala most likely referred to the floating platforms built adjacent to the
Harbor of Neorion to provide indefinite access to the Pisan merchants. It was likely built on the
western side of the harbor to decrease congestion and confusion with Byzantine vessels. The tax
exemptions on imported bullion were meant to increase the power of the imperial treasury and,
thereby, increase the supply of imperial loans to Byzantine subjects in hopes of stopping
Venetian commerce. The reduction of taxes paid on imports brought from foreign kingdoms and
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empires suggests that the Byzantines understood the commercial reach of the Pisans and sought
to diversify the quantity of goods in the city. In this fashion, the city’s markets would quickly
dilute the Venetian’s commercial share and thus reduce their economic power.
Despite these grants aimed at slowing Venetian influence, the refusal by the Byzantines
to accept Pisan demands on tax-exemptions for outbound goods was significant for three reasons.
The refusal weakened Pisan commercial abilities in the city and hindered commercial growth.
Unlike Venetians who retained tax-exemptions on outbound goods from Constantinople, the
Pisans were required to pay the full tax amount. While it is possible that the Byzantines did so as
a safeguard against another Italian republic dominating the city, this prevented the Pisans from
quickly expanding their activity in Constantinople. Second, it weakened the Byzantine imperial
government and its response to thwart Venetian dominance. The Chrysobull of 1111 was
designed to prevent another Venetian-like takeover, but it prevented both an immediate
economic response to the Venetians and an economic relief to Constantinopolitans and their
businesses. Lastly, the Chrysobull actually strengthened Venetian influence. The Pisans’ position
was immediately weakened as they did not establish economic rights equal to their Venetian
counterparts’. If the Pisan position was equal to its Venetian counterpart, it might have allowed
the markets to repel the Venetians’ influence and provided Byzantine businesses financial relief.
This disadvantageous position likely depressed Pisan enthusiasm in investing within the city and
consequently prevented Pisa from expanding trade in Constantinople. What the Chrysobull did
accomplish was an increase in Pisan enthusiasm for trading throughout the empire, which
conflicted with Venetian interests.
With the accession of Manuel I Komnenos, the Pisans returned to negotiate a fairer deal
as they saw the new emperor’s disdain for Venice and his desire to make Constantinople great
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again for the Byzantine subjects. Signed in 1170, the new Chrysobull extended Pisan economic
privileges while granting more immovable lands to increase the size of the Pisan quarter, hoping
to bring more merchants into the city.118 After the Chrysobull of 1170, the now-larger trade
quarter in Constantinople was beneficial to Pisa for two reasons. First, the location of the quarter
was economically and politically beneficial as it was situated along the eastern wall of the
Venetian quarter. This permanently denied Venice access to the Harbor of Neorion and increased
the costs for Venetian merchants to export and import products to the city. Since Pisan markets
were not subject to certain trade regulations imposed on their Venetian counterparts, there was a
higher incentive to trade with the Byzantines in Constantinople.
Despite Manuel I Komnenos’ attempts to rectify the mistakes made decades earlier, Pisan
merchants were still not enthusiastic about investing within Constantinople. Even with the larger
trade quarter, unrestricted access to the Harbor of Neorion, and tax-exemptions on goods, the
Pisans never saw much opportunity. Pisa had already expanded trade throughout the
Mediterranean and enjoyed lucrative trade in the Crusader States, Egypt, and North Africa,
which suggests that Constantinople was less attractive economically. Pisan merchants could not
exert their influence and lower the prices to compete with Venice in the homogenous markets
(i.e., those involving meat, fish, bread, oils, and certain non-food goods) as they did not have as
strong a rapport with Byzantine businesses as did the Venetians.119 The lack of enthusiasm,
inability to influence homogenous markets, and the subsequent lack of capital to continue
investing in the city forced Pisan merchants either to leave Constantinople for other Byzantine
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cities or to join their stores with the Venetians’ to turn a profit. By the 1180s the Pisan quarter
had effectively become a puppet for Venetian merchants.
The near instantaneous rise and fall of the Pisan quarter in Constantinople is regretfully
chalked up as a mere footnote by historians, never amounting to more than a sentence or two in
the historiography. Yet Pisa’s role in the twelfth-century trade wars was highly significant for a
few reasons. The Pisans’ involvement in Constantinople shows that their initial purpose for
occupying a trade quarter in the city was not only to generate profits but was also to compete
with Venice. For an Italian republic that had established enormous wealth trading throughout the
Mediterranean to suddenly want to invest in a city that was economically controlled by Venice,
shows the relationship and competition between the Italian city-states. For the Byzantines, Pisa
was a means of pushing Venetian merchants out of the city and restoring Byzantine commercial
dominance. The investment did not pay off as the Pisans soon realized they entered the city in a
weakened position and could not rise above the power of Venice. Constantinople was therefore a
tertiary investment, an experiment meant to irritate and annoy their Italian adversary, and to
serve as an economic colony in the outer boundaries of their commercial influence. Pisa’s short
run in Constantinople shows how far the Italians were willing to go to compete with each other
but also how willing the Byzantines were to look outside their imperial boarders to find a
suitable investor to upend Venetian commercial dominance. Pisa’s failure in Constantinople can
therefore be seen as a trial or test run for the Byzantines in how to manage commercial
competition. This trial would be understood and refined over the years, culminating in 1169 with
the welcoming of a new trade partner to Constantinople that unveiled Venice’s true endgame.
The Republic of Genoa had arrived.
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IV.ii. THE REPUBLIC OF GENOA

The great city-state of Genoa was founded half a century before Pisa and would become
the suitable alternative trading partner to counter the Venetian dominance in Constantinople.
Genoa’s economic foundations were stronger than Pisa’s because of its longer, more carefully
established legal code, naval and maritime experience, and economic investment strategies.
Located on the opposite side of the northern Italian Peninsula, neighboring Pisa to the north, the
city resides in the Liguria region.120 Like Venice and Pisa, Genoa had to find trade partners to
sustain its economic power. While Venice sought Byzantium and Pisa pursued the Crusader
States and North Africa, Genoa looked to the western kingdoms for trade. Trading with the
kingdoms of France and England, Al-Andalus (Islamic Iberia) and other western and central
powers, Genoa found its commercial niche as a partner of the west. It should be noted that the
Genoese also conducted considerable trade with the Crusader States,121 but the republic focused
on the western European powers. These trade partners helped Genoa retain both its autonomy
and its status as a strong Italian economic republic. Further, Genoa’s geographic location and its
influential economic and political powers in northern Italy made the small republic a good
prospect for Manuel I Komnenos to formalize trade with. In 1160 Genoa was the last Italian citystate to enter the Constantinople’s markets before the Fourth Crusade.
The legal foundations for the strong economic success experienced in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries stemmed from one law regarding the funding of commercial expeditions. While
the law itself has not been preserved, the business dealings of Giovanni Scriba from the 1160s
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show how the laws worked. In his writings, all business propositions and expeditions required
two participants: one primary financier and the party conducting the operation. Scriba described
the arrangement:
Oliverius Nivetella and Oliverius Ferretus on the directive and
authority of their lord Oto Dormacagar contracted a societas in
which this Oliverius Nivetella states that he contributed 25 pounds
and Oliverius Ferretus and his lord and the same Oliverius
[Ferretus] contributed 17-1/2 pounds. Oliverius [Nivetella] must
take this societas to Palermo and then Sicily and from there this
ship and its crew will return without exception and after the capital
has been divided [among the crew] he will divide the profits of this
venture equally with Oliverius [Ferretus] or his agent.122
This shows several important aspects of Genoese trade and how they conducted themselves in
Constantinople. The societas was a key development in Genoese trade and ventures, which set
them apart from the other Italian states. These legal documents, called commenda, established a
sort of check-and-balance on commercial investment and ventures. It checked individuals who
wanted to engage in commercial ventures by ensuring they were fiscally responsible, evident in
the law’s requirement that the venturer must provide one third the cost. The law further checked
the venturers by forcing them to find an investor to fund the remaining two-thirds of the
commercial endeavor. This allowed both parties to create a business plan that would yield profits
and force individuals to conserve their money. This fiscal responsibility was what separated
Genoa from the other Italian states because it created protections and regulations that ensured
their citizens were held accountable. Venice had no such regulations within its legal system,
while the Chrysobulls did not contain any legal repercussions for failed businesses, piracy, fraud,
or other acts of theft. Pisa, with its quick economic rise and fall in Constantinople, also did not
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have any sort of laws mimicking those of Genoa. This allowed the Genoese to invest
strategically in Constantinople’s markets, rather than enter without deliberation.
The legal procedures for Genoese merchants created protectionist policy for their
subjects. Genoa differed from Pisa and Venice, whose merchants funded themselves. Venetian
merchants made strong returns on investments and influenced how they achieved continued
profits. This included using monopolistic methods, such as absorbing all competition and
controlling several key industries in the city. As Pisa was not trading in the city as an
independent participant for long, there are no records of legal procedures regarding trade and
investment. Instead, an examination of Pisan trade throughout the Mediterranean would be
necessary to understand if there were any laws for overseas investment. Therefore, what Genoa
had was exceptional. The investor-venturer joint relationship was both unique and important:
unique in that it was the only known two-party investment strategy before the Renaissance and
predated the British joint-stocks by centuries, and important in that the investment strategy called
for targeted investment, a scheme that allowed Genoa to aggressively fight off Venetian
interests.
The two-party investment strategy allowed the Genoese to enter into numerous markets
and establish a substantial presence almost immediately. As the republic was established a half
century prior to Pisa, Genoa effectively perfected its economic model well before its entrance
into Constantinople. By dividing the cost of the venture unevenly, with the venturer financing a
third and the investor two-thirds and dividing the profits evenly, the incentive of the venturer to
look overseas grew. The primary incentive was that both participants were able to profit faster as
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their rate of return was substantially higher.123 This method was how Genoa, the small city-state
in northwestern Italy, created a powerful economy that was revered by kingdoms throughout
western Europe. The investor, likely a wealthy and educated Italian banker, businessman,
merchant, or noble, saw the investments as sound and signed onto overseas ventures. Profits
were divided equally among both participants and losses were born equally.124 This clause
allowed Genoese merchants and investors to carefully plan and analyze the market they wished
to enter. This targeting strategy worked, especially in Constantinople. As industrial innovation
thrived in the twelfth century, Venetian merchants were vulnerable. Instead of innovating their
techniques, Venetian merchants grew accustomed to their strong profit margins within the city’s
industries. This made them vulnerable in several key sectors, allowing Genoa to latch onto and
target these openings. The specialized and strategic targeting of Venetian-controlled industrial
sectors in Constantinople forced Venice to respond, escalating relations and leading to war.
This refined economic laws and policies were, for the most part, a means to justify the
historical military might of Genoa. Its naval strength was supreme in the Mediterranean by the
twelfth century, as protection against seaborne raiders was paramount to its survival.125 Genoa’s
history of maritime warfare attracted the interest of Manuel I Komnenos for a few important
reasons. First, the Genoese’s constant wars with the Islamic states, evident from their
participation in the First Crusade in 1095, and their attacks on Bugia in 1136, Almeira in 1137,
and Iberia in 1146-48, fueled their passion for naval supremacy and regional dominance in
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maritime trade.126 This passion drove Genoa’s lust for power which aggressively sought
hostilities with Pisa. Wars between Genoa and Pisa broke out during the early-twelfth century as
Genoese fleets raided Pisan vessels after papal decrees favored the archbishop of Pisa instead of
Genoa, shattering once again the delicate relationship between the two maritime powers.
Second, the Byzantines needed a maritime power to counterbalance Venetian control of
Constantinople’s markets. Rather than looking towards simply an economic adversary of Venice,
as they did with Pisa, the Byzantines appeared to look for a rival with a strong navy to disrupt
trade. As the Genoese refined and enhanced their fleet, using a combination of Byzantine-styled
heavy galleys (dromone) and the Italian-styled light galleys augmented with an impressive array
of armed mercantile cogs, the navy could conduct numerous attacks and raids quickly and leave
at a tremendous pace. This fleet was tested during the Genoese-Pisan Wars in the twelfth
century, cementing Genoese naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean and further
demonstrating its power in the east. By the time Manuel I Komnenos granted the first Chrysobull
to Genoa, the Genoese fleet had already begun raiding Venetian ships.
The third reason for the inclusion of the Genoese into the Constantinopolitan markets was
less about naval strength and its ability to disrupt Venetian trade and more about Genoa’s
friendly relationships with the Crusader States, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Byzantine
Empire. Genoa’s participation in the First Crusade was strictly naval as it provided the western
armies with protections against the Egyptian navy and raided fortified positions along the
coasts.127 The successful crusade helped Genoa establish itself as a regional naval power which
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gained favor with the Byzantines who saw Genoa as a potential ally in reestablishing the Roman
Empire.128
The Chrysobull of 1169 marked the beginning of Genoese trade activities with
Constantinople. The treaty granted typical economic rights that Venice and Pisa acquired in their
respective Chrysobulls, but Genoa obtained more privileges.129 The most significant grant given
was Genoa’s ability to choose the location of its trade quarter. The significance was twofold:
first, the Genoese quarter was established within the Severan Wall and second, the Genoese
quarter lay directly south of the Harbor of Neorion and the Harbor of Prosphorion.130 Within the
Severan Wall resided all imperial administration buildings, the Great Palace (residence of the
emperor), the Acropolis, Hagia Sofia, and the Hippodrome. The close proximity to Byzantine
imperial power showed that Manuel I Komnenos both trusted and respected the Genoese enough
to grant the immovable property within the Severan Wall and saw the Genoese as an important
southern European ally. This suggests that Manuel I Komnenos understood that Genoa’s
economic protections and regulations could compete with the Venetians’ and dilute Venice’s
market share in Constantinople. The location of the quarter is also important in understanding the
economic and political composition of Constantinople in the late-twelfth century. Both harbors
of Neorion and Prosphorion were used by the Venetian and Pisan merchants for decades until
each were granted a scala, and even after this, the landing-stages were still meant to be built
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within the harbors. Venice’s and Pisa’s quarters were further west which meant
Constantinopolitans were less likely to purchase goods from them. The Genoese quarter, on the
other hand, lay directly between the city’s markets and the harbor, allowing merchants and
Byzantines to trade fluidly from market to port and vice versa. The Chrysobull of 1169 marked a
substantial shift in foreign trade and Italian political relations through the establishment of a
Genoese trade quarter and its proximity to the imperial administration and the two harbors that
Venice and Pisa relied on for trade. This treaty influenced the Venetians’ systematic retaliation
to fight off the ongoing trade war between themselves and the Byzantines.
The hostility by the Venetians towards the opening of the Genoese quarter was felt
immediately. In 1171 an armed mob of Venetian and Pisan subjects in Constantinople entered
the Genoese quarter, burning buildings, looting stores, and killing Genoese merchants. The
massacre set in motion several important events that followed, and many historians consider this
the first event that led to the Fourth Crusade (though this essay argues that, the first step was
simply the granting of immovable property to the Venetians in Constantinople). The reaction to
the massacre was swift as Manuel I Komnenos ordered, in secret, the arrest of all Venetians and
Pisans residing within the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire and the confiscation of all
Venetian and Pisan goods, property, and other belongings.131 Manuel I’s actions were important
to understanding the political motivations as his desire for economic reforms drew him to despise
the Venetians. This shows that the Byzantines no longer believed that Venice should retain any
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political and economic relationships with the empire, turning instead towards their trustworthy
ally Genoa.
After the Byzantine-Venetian War of 1171, which was a direct result of the mass
incarceration of Venetian subjects, both Venice and Genoa began taking their hostilities out in
the Mediterranean Sea. Piracy against the Venetians became the standard operations as the
Genoese fleet was built for such actions. To aid the Genoese in disrupting the Venetian maritime
shipping and trade routes, Manuel I Komnenos enacted and enforced a clause in the 1169
Chrysobull that reimbursed Genoa for any captured or destroyed merchant ship within imperial
waters. The Chrysobull affirmed, “if some Genoese ship passes from some part and is wrecked
within Romania (i.e., in Roman lands), and it happens that goods are removed by someone, then
an imperial order follows that the lost goods will be recovered and regained.”132 The Genoese
acquired this privilege for two specific reasons. The rise in piracy from Venetian ships justified
adding the provision to safeguard Genoese ships and to encourage Genoese merchants to
continue trading despite the risks involved. The Byzantines also needed to ensure relations with
Genoa remained stable as part of their desire not only to reconquer the west but also to keep a
strong ally.133 By removing fears of Venetian piracy in open waters with legal provisions
designed to reimburse Genoese merchants, the Byzantines buttressed their relationship both
politically and economically with Genoa.
After attempts to distance himself from Venice, Manuel I Komnenos presented a new
Chrysobull in 1170 that granted further legal protections on economic privileges between
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Constantinople and Genoa. By now the Genoese began expanding trade into the Crusader States
and the Egyptian Caliphate. The emperor allowed Genoese merchants the use of Constantinople
as a half-way point between Italy and the Middle East. To ensure their quarter remained secure,
the Chrysobull mandated, in addition to protections for the Genoese en route to Jerusalem,
numerous legal and financial protections on all Genoese merchants and their goods. The
Chrysobull stated the following:
The law orders, that if Peter suits Paul asking from him a good
worth 100 nomismata and the defendant Paul has not any
immovable property, such as a house or a field, the judge forces
Paul to give a guarantee. The guarantee which is required from the
defendant Paul is of the following kind: Paul will have to give as a
guarantor someone wealthy and important, who will guarantee for
him as follows: “I, X, (for example John), guarantee completely
that Paul does not come to the court; if Paul does not come to the
court, then I, John will give the amount that Peter is asking from
Paul.”134
This section of the Chrysobull was a scheme by the Byzantines and Genoese merchants to ensure
two economic goals. Allowing the Genoese to take no responsibilities in their transactions with
other merchants in Constantinople ensured that merchants could purchase products from
Venetian and Pisan stores and divert payments, leaving the debts to be paid by a third party,
typically wealthy Byzantine nobles and Venetian merchants.135 The treaty also allowed Genoese
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merchants who were not regularly trading in the city to divert payments to other Italian
merchants. Since the city was viewed as a rest stop, Genoese merchants who primarily dealt with
trade in the Middle East could avoid some financial burden by diverting costs. This scheme had a
definitive effect on relations among Venice, Pisa, and the Byzantines, because the diversion of
costs meant that the Venetians would bear the financial burden of Genoese merchants. To
remedy the effects of piracy conducted against Genoese merchant vessels by their adversaries,
the Byzantines established shipwreck and piracy clauses to bolster trade and further degrade
relations with Venice and Pisa. Like the 1169 Chrysobull, the Chrysobull of 1170 mandated
prosecution of piracy against Genoese ships. Protections against piracy or shipwreck from
Venetians included the complete restitution of goods by the Byzantines.136 This was an economic
victory for Manuel I Komnenos because he realigned all political powers against Venice while
shifting all economic powers to Genoa and Constantinople. The Chrysobull of 1170 provided the
Genoa with legal protections on financial transactions which allowed its merchants to divert
payments to Venetian and Pisan merchants. This mandate influenced retaliatory actions against
Genoese mercantile ships traversing in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.
Unfortunately, Byzantines’ relations with the Genoese soon followed the pattern of
relations with Pisa when in 1182 the Greek population entered the Latin trade corridor (the three
Italian quarters) and massacred the entire population. The tragedy left all the trade quarters burnt
and destroyed, angering the Genoese and the other Italian states. The cause of the massacre is
widely debated by historians, with many suggesting that the Constantinopolitans were to blame
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due to their hatred of the Venetians, while others suggest that the Venetians were to blame
because of their economic takeover and disregard for Greek merchants.137 Regardless of the
differing views, the Pisans and Genoese did eventually reduce their presence in the city while
Venice was still bent on maintaining a strong foothold. Genoa reduced its presence by the turn of
the century as profits from previously established trade in the west increased while trade in the
Islamic world continued to grow concurrently. It was not until ten years later that the Genoese
were financially compensated, albeit with a caveat. Isaac II Angelos ratified a Chrysobull in
1192 that compensated, at most, a fraction of the value of lost goods because the emperor placed
fault at the feet of the Italian states rather than his own subjects.138 In seeking to change the
economic and political catastrophes caused by the Komnenian Dynasty, Isaac II Angelos hoped
to cut ties once and for all with the Italian states, which reacted with aggressive attacks against
all Byzantine ships.
Despite the Chrysobull of 1192’s attempt at partial financial restoration, the Genoese and
Pisans had already eroded any chance of recompense. By the time of the 1192 Chrysobull, piracy
in the Aegean had reached its peak as Genoa and Pisa rejoined their previously shattered alliance
and focused on raiding Byzantine ships. Focusing on the plethora of Greek islands in the
Aegean, many of which were uninhabited, Genoa and Pisa used their navies to establish
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advantageous positions to raid Byzantine ships.139 The actions were most likely targeted to
reclaim the cost of damages incurred during the massacre in 1182, which explains why the 1192
Chrysobull restituted only partial financial costs. Regardless of what the Byzantines tried
politically, Genoa would continue to raid various islands and cities across the Aegean Sea until
the commencement of the Fourth Crusade.140 The attitudes of the Genoese changed from
accepting and supporting Byzantine economic reforms to antagonistic for their lack of support
after raids against the Genoese quarter in 1171 and the Massacre of the Latins in 1183.
From a small republic to a Mediterranean economic power, Genoa’s ascension nurtured
the determination of the Byzantines under Manuel I Komnenos to fight Venetian aggression in
Constantinople. The inclusion of Genoa into the city cemented its status as an economic power
that rivaled Venice and unveiled the curtain of hatred that the Venetians had kept hidden for
decades. The culmination of Genoese raids on Venetian ships, Byzantine reforms meant to
bolster Greek businesses, and the collapse of the Pisan quarter gave way to a war that altered the
political and economic fabric of the Mediterranean.
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V. THE FOURTH CRUSADE

The past three chapters have examined the prolonged and often violent trade war between
the Italian states and the Byzantine Empire in the twelfth century, yet the question over why this
economic conflict merged with the Fourth Crusade still remains unanswered. The situations in
the Holy Lands and the Aegean Sea were stochastically independent in all facets of life. The
economic struggles in the Aegean Sea had no tangible correlation with the religious and political
situations developing in Rome and Jerusalem. So then how did these two worlds suddenly
collide and engulf the Mediterranean into a whirlwind of uncertainty and chaos? The answer lies
in understanding how the following three disconnected events became intertwined: the religious
motivations of Pope Innocent III, the political turmoil following the usurping of Isaac II Angelos
(r.1185-95, 1203-4), and the financial manipulation by Doge Enrico Dandolo.
The historiography has suggested that the Massacre of the Latins (c. 1171) was the
primary root cause for the sack of Constantinople thus offering an overly simplistic explanation
for the Fourth Crusade. This has contributed to a substantial gap between the political and
religious motivations in Rome, France, and Egypt. The massacre was an event in which the
Greek population began killing Italians throughout the empire after the Byzantine imperial
administration ordered the seizure of all lands and assets owned by Italians. The historiography
failed in understanding that the Massacre of the Latins did not occur spontaneously nor was it the
result of a singular event. Instead, the massacre was the culmination of decades of open hostility
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and civil unrest against the Venetian merchants in Constantinople. The origins of the massacre
can be traced to the ever-growing population and economic influence the Italians had in the city
in the mid-twelfth century. Their influence became intolerable and influenced Manuel I
Komnenos to seize all Italian holdings.141 The popular coup by Andronikos in 1171 brought out a
state of hysteria among the Greeks, which broke out into widespread killings. As the massacre
was carried out by Greek subjects and not the Byzantine imperial administration, the Doge of
Venice did not see justification for war, and yet historians still suggest that this event was the
root cause of the sack of Constantinople. Instead, as will be shown, the Massacre of the Latins
played no substantial role in the reasoning behind Doge Dandolo’s diversion of the crusaders to
Constantinople. Rather, a series of events had descended upon the city of Venice that created or
reinforced existing motivations.

V.i.

POPE INNOCENT III AND THE HOLY LANDS

Prior to his coronation as Pontiff, Lotario de’ Conti di Segni was a young member of a
powerful family from Gavignano, Italy.142 As nephew to Pope Clement III (r.1187-91), Lotario
studied scripture in Rome and Paris before concluding his studies in Bologna and later joining
the priesthood. As the nephew of His Holiness, Lotario was promoted quickly and by 1191, at
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the young age of twenty-nine, he acquired the title of Cardinal-Priest of Santa Pudenziana in
Rome.143
His election as Pontiff in 1198 was controversial and his selection of name, Innocent III,
shocked many within the College of Cardinals.144 Pope Innocent III, only 37 years of age at his
coronation, immediately began consolidating his power within the Church by regaining papal
authority over the armies of Europe. His dissatisfaction with the Islamic reconquest of the Holy
Lands was enough to justify his desire to assume command of the armies of the Papal States and
the crusader armies in the Holy Lands. This dissatisfaction was based on two issues. First, after
learning of the mistakes in previous crusades, Innocent III recognized that the squabbling among
kings and emperors had bogged down military operations, slowed troop movement, and
ultimately hindered efforts to conquer and reconquer the Holy Lands. Rather than allowing the
kings and emperors to command the crusader armies, Innocent III demanded that all soldiers
who took part in the campaigns be under his authority. Second, as the armies were controlled by
kings, emperors, and lords, the task of organizing a cohesive offensive proved difficult and
allowed the Islamic armies to successfully counter the crusaders.145 Together, these issues
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influenced the Pope’s decision to assume control over all crusading efforts. With the control of
the armies, Innocent III began formulating an operation to reconquer the Kingdom of Jerusalem.
After his coronation, the Byzantine Emperor Alexius III Angelos (r. 1198-1203) sent
messengers to demand military action be taken against the Islamic armies in Syria and Palestine.
To the Byzantines, the reasoning was simple: the empire was threatened on all sides and needed
relief, particularly in Anatolia and Syria.146 In return for military action by His Holiness,
Innocent III demanded the Greek church return “back to the obedience of the Apostolic See, its
mother, from whose magisterium it had withdrawn.”147 Innocent III desired the reunification and
the end of the East-West Schism that had hindered relations. In his correspondence with the
Byzantine emperor, the Pope called on the Greeks to end the schism and rejoin the Roman
Church, stating:
You have asked, because you are in doubt and desirous to learn the
reason we call the Roman Church one and universal in our letters,
as it is now divided in certain particular ways; since the shepherd is
one and the flock is one, even if there are several pastors appointed
under one prince of pastors, Christ. But we respond thus to your
questions. The church is called universal for two reasons. For the
understanding of things said must be taken from the reason for
speaking, since the thing is not subordinate to the word but the
word is subordinate to the thing. The church, which is made up of
all the churches, is called universal, which in Greek is called by the
word catholic. And, according to this understanding of the word,
the Roman church is not the universal church but part of the
universal church, namely, first and particularly like the head in the
body, since the fullness of power is in it, while some share of the
plentitude devolves on the others. And that the universal church is
called one, which contains all of the other churches under it; and
according to this reckoning of the name, only the Roman church is
called universal since it alone by the privilege of its singular
dignity is in charge of the others. Just as God is called the universal
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Lord, not as if He is now divided into very special or subordinate
types, but because all things are under his dominion.148
The correspondence between Innocent III and Alexios III Angelos demonstrates the important
religious motivations of both participants regarding the assistance of military forces in the Holy
Lands. Innocent III’s authoritative prose suggests his strong desire for reunification with the
eastern church. The reunion of the Greek church with Rome would both strengthen the political
power of the Papacy and extend Christian influence in the Middle East. While the Crusader
States had either waned or collapsed, a Roman Catholic Byzantine Empire would bring military
and economic relief to them. The absorption of the Greek church would allow the Papacy to
increase a military presence in the region and protect economic trade routes in Anatolia and
Syria and Christian pilgrims journeying to Jerusalem and would decrease the political influence
of the Ayyubid Sultanate. For Innocent III, the deal would have been a non-zero-sum game. His
Holiness would finally reunify the Greek church into one universal church, while simultaneously
completing his personal goal of reconquering the Holy Lands.
For Alexios III Angelos, the prospect was conflicting. The need for military aid in the
eastern territories was of critical importance to retain the empire and its influence in the region.
The aid would also allow the Byzantines to redeploy their forces west to quell insurgency in the
Greek territories against the Bulgarians and Vlachs who were encroaching upon the borders.149
Politically, the agreement would have allowed the Byzantines to mend relations with western
European kingdoms. Since the end of the First Crusade, Byzantine relations with the west
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crumbled due to a failure in upholding the treaties regarding the reallocation of conquered lands
to the Papacy. By agreeing to the terms demanded by Innocent III, the Byzantines would restore
relations and increase political power and influence throughout Europe and the Middle East.
Religiously, Alexios III Angelos was conflicted. The Great Schism in 1054, caused by
political and religious differences between the Papacy and the Byzantine Empire, established the
eastern Orthodox Church and effectively divided Christianity in Europe. Since then, attempts
were made to reunify the two churches under one leader, but no such success had occurred. This
created numerous tensions during crusading efforts throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries
and only hurt Byzantine relations with the west. By reunifying with the Roman church, the
Byzantines would reduce their expenditures on religious structures by allowing the Papacy to
fund the churches. Yet, Alexios III Angelos practiced the Greek Orthodox beliefs and still
supported a divided Christian church.
Pope Innocent III’s correspondence with the emperor continued to deteriorate because
Alexios III Angelos refused church reunification, insisted that the Greeks have administrative
control over Cyprus, and made other demands that would strengthened Byzantine influence.150
To remedy this situation, the pope instructed that letters be sent to the Bulgarian Emperor
Kaloyan (r.1196-1207) to persuade his empire to rejoin the Roman church. Kaloyan responded
enthusiastically about rejoining with the church by stating:
In the Name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen.
Since it has pleased our Lord Jesus Christ to make me lord and
emperor of all Bulgaria and Wallachia, I have enquired in the
writings of our ancients and the books and laws of our
predecessors, emperors of blessed memory, how they established
the kingdom of the Bulgars and the imperial foundation, and, on
careful investigation, we have found in their writings that those
emperors of the Bulgarians, Simon, Peter, and Samuel, and our
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predecessors received the crown for the empire and the patriarchal
blessing from the most Holy Roman Church of God and the
Apostolic See, Peter the Prince of the Apostles. So, also, my
empire has desired to receive the blessing and the foundation of the
imperial crown as head of his empire, and the patriarchal blessing
from the Roman church and from the Apostolic See, Peter, the
Prince of the Apostles, and from our most Holy Father, the
universal pope, Innocent III, and the mandate of the Lord Pope
shall have been given and granted in the city of Trnovo of my
Empire, for the making and consecrating of archbishops,
metropolitans, and bishops, and the remaining ecclesiastical
sacramental obedience he granted to my empire so that they may
have the fullest power in every holding and things belonging to my
Empire.151
The purpose of reconverting the Bulgarians was clear. The empire bordered the Byzantine
territory in Greece, which suggests that Innocent III was attempting to surround the Byzantines
and isolate them religiously and politically. Converting Bulgarians to Roman Catholicism meant
that the Byzantines could no longer rely on other eastern Orthodox rulers for support.152
Reunifying eastern empires and kingdoms back into the Roman church allowed Innocent III to
increase his political influence and put more pressure on the Byzantines to accept his proposal.
This strategy would come to fruition during the Fourth Crusade as the Bulgarians and
Hungarians supported and supplied the crusading armies at Zara and Constantinople. Further
correspondence with the Bulgarians strengthened their relations and continued to isolate the
Byzantines.153
While Innocent III was corresponding with the eastern European empires, the Holy Lands
had descended into turmoil. In 1193, Saladin died and his Sultanate descended into disarray as
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his sons and brother fought over succession.154 His eldest son al-Afdal, Governor of Damascus,
attempted to consolidate his power against his siblings Zahir al-Ghazi (controlled Aleppo), al‘Aziz ‘Uthman (controlled Egypt), and Saladin’s brother al-‘Adil (controlled upper
Mesopotamia).155 The following war between al-Afdal and Uthman resulted in the reduction of
military and political influence. Uthman’s untimely death in 1198 sparked al-‘Adil to declare
himself the Sultan of Egypt and Syria and declare war on his nephews al-Afdal and al-Ghazi in
Damascus. By 1201, the war had concluded; Damascus lay in ruins, Byzantium made small
gains in Anatolia, the Khwarazmian Empire expanded into the Levant, and the once impressive
Ayyubid Sultanate could only muster a fraction of its strength.156
Four months prior to Uthman’s death, aware of the situations in the Holy Lands and the
decline of the Ayyubids, Pope Innocent III issued the bull Post Miserabile, which formally
declared war against the Sultan of Egypt and Syria. Understanding the failures of the second and
third crusades in 1147/50 and 1189/92, respectively, Innocent III determined that any effort to
reconquer Jerusalem would be futile so long as the Egyptian capital remained. Therefore, the
crusade’s primary objective was to conquer the Egyptian cities of Alexandria and Cairo, which
would have effectively unseated Islamic control over the Holy Lands. The capture of Egypt
would thus weaken the defenses surrounding Jerusalem, Aleppo, Acre, and the other Palestinian
cities. While the military objectives were meticulously planned, gathering support proved
difficult. Innocent III never acknowledged the need for European kings to join the military
efforts in Post Miserabile, opting instead to have local bishops recruit soldiers by granting
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remissions of sin to those who joined.157 To help spread the word of the crusade, the pope
ordered Cardinal-Priest Soffredus, Cardinal-Deacon Gratian, and Cardinal-Priest Peter Dianus to
gather the armies of Venice, Pisa and Genoa, and France and England, respectively.158 It was
then that the focus of the crusade shifted from Egypt to Constantinople.

V.ii.

VENETIAN EXPLOITATION OF THE FOURTH CRUSADE

The arrival of emissaries to all three northern Italian states with economic holdings in
Constantinople was cause for concern. By the turn of the century, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa were
actively engaged in economic warfare in Constantinople, piracy in the Aegean Sea, and
economic reforms in northern Italy. Their arrival invited each republic a new objective, namely,
to use the crusade as leverage to gain favor both politically and economically. Politically, the
crusade was advantageous to the Italian states for two reasons. Accepting the pope’s decree
meant their armies would aid in the capture of territory throughout the Holy Lands, which would
increase their influence in the Middle East while also gaining favor with the pope. Religiously,
the northern Italian states were not seen as pious, which suggests the pope had believed the
republics prioritized economic profits over a religious life. Improving relations with the papacy
would enhance their position both in northern Italy and in Constantinople.
The possible economic advantage was obvious. The emissary’s purpose was to secure a
contract with one of the republics to construct a fleet large enough to carry the crusading force.
As the Byzantines had refused all requests for reunification with the Roman church, they
simultaneously had refused all access of their territory for crusading efforts. This meant that
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Pope Innocent III’s armies could not travel through the Byzantine Empire to reach the Holy
Lands, as had been done during the First Crusade. Therefore, securing a contract to build a fleet
was important to the papacy. The Italian states’ financial and military gains from the contract
would enforce their claims in the Aegean Sea and increase their strength to combat the other
participants.
The negotiations between the crusading armies and the Italian states provided evidence to
why Venice exploited the crusaders. Robert of Clari’s account of the crusade gave a vague
explanation why the Venetians were able to accept the emissaries’ negotiations:
They commanded the messengers to hire vessels to transport four
thousand knights and their harness and one hundred thousand men
on foot. The messengers got ready their gear and went straight on
until they came to Genoa, and they spoke to the Genoese and told
them what they were seeking, and the Genoese said they could not
help them in it at all. Then they went to Pisa and spoke to them of
Pisa, and they answered them that they did not have so many
vessels and could not do anything for them. Then they went on to
Venice and spoke to the doge of Venice and told him what they
were seeking: that they wanted to hire passage for four thousand
knights and their harnesses and for one hundred thousand men on
foot. When the doge heard of this, he said he would think on it, for
so great an affair ought to be well considered.159
While Robert of Clari’s account does not give the exact reason why the Pisans and Genoese
refused to build the navy, several factors can be implied. The late-twelfth century saw extensive
naval conflict in the Aegean Sea by the Italian states. Piracy operations by Genoa and Pisa were
met with the large Venetian and Byzantine fleets which led to many causalities. Merchant ships
had protection against enemy activity in various parts of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas,
which meant that Pisa and Genoa faced a gradual deterioration of both their naval and mercantile
fleets. The loss of their naval capacity meant they could not sufficiently secure transportation for
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the crusading armies. The logistical barriers for providing enough vessels were another issue that
Pisa and Genoa faced. Both republics did not have territory capable of producing the quantity of
lumber the crusaders wanted and while they certainly had a large network of territories abroad,
they could not rely on them to supplement the resources. Further preventing their ability to
construct the fleet was the lack of infrastructure. Pisan and Genoese ports were fitted primarily
for commercial use, which suggests that naval shipyards were either in Corsica or Sardinia.160
The location is important because the delay in both construction and transportation would hinder
military operations and lead to delayed departure.
Venice, meanwhile, had all the necessary logistical parameters required to undertake such
a gargantuan task. By 1200, the republic was no longer merely a city-state and had amassed
numerous holdings in the Balkans and along the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea. Shipyards
were built along the coast for to increase the naval strength of the republic and to establish a
network of ports to protect Venetian merchants. This network allowed Venice to construct the
vessels requested by the crusaders more quickly. Acquiring lumber was not an issue either as the
Balkan territories and northeastern Italy provided the Venetian navy with an abundance of
materials. But without a labor force willing to construct the fleet, the crusaders would be
stranded in Italy. The Venetians suspended all commercial activity in the city and, perhaps to a
lesser extent throughout the republic, redirecting all subjects to work on the construction of the
fleet.161 This ensured the crusaders that the Venetians were willing to honor the agreement
between both parties.
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The terms of the contract indicate the Venetians knew that the crusaders were unable to
finance the voyage. Geoffrey of Villehardouin presented a different perspective from Robert of
Clari, implying that the terms were grossly one-sided. While Robert of Clari wrote that the
Venetians agreed to a cost of eighty-seven thousand marks,162 Geoffrey of Villehardouin
suggested a higher sum:
We [Venice] will build horse transports to carry 4,500 horses and
9,000 squires, with 4,500 knights and 20,000 foot sergeants
travelling in ships. And we will agree to provide food for all these
horses and people for nine months. This is the minimum we would
provide in return for a payment of four marks per horse and two
marks per man. The total cost of what has just been outlined would
amount to 94,000 marks. And what’s more we will provide, for the
love of God, fifty armed galleys, on condition that for as long as
our association lasts we will have one half of everything we
capture on land or at sea, and you will have the other.163
The difference between both sources is key to understanding why the Venetians exploited the
crusaders. First, Robert of Clari’s account of the Fourth Crusade was more focused on the
religious perspectives and thus presented the preparations in an overview. Villehardouin’s
account was more narrative and detailed and provided a more coherent understanding of the
reasons behind the Venetian’s financial prowess. Villehardouin’s account indicated that the
Venetians purposefully increased the quantity of vessels to be built to force the crusaders into
debt. Robert of Clari’s account shows that the crusaders needed a fleet for only four thousand
knights and a hundred thousand foot soldiers, yet Villehardouin showed that the emissaries
agreed to 4,500 knights, and roughly 130,000 foot soldiers.164 While this may seem trivial, it is
important because the Venetians sought payment in terms of how many soldiers each vessel
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could support rather than how many actual soldiers partook in the crusade. This had created a
situation in which the crusading army could not financially afford the vessels and were forced,
by legal contract, to find a way to pay Venice.
The collection of coins from each soldier arriving in Venice had further influenced the
Venetian’s financial exploitation of the crusaders. As the army was so large, many of the
crusaders were sent to other ports to stay until they would depart. This meant that only a fraction
of the crusaders were physically within Venice, and as such, only a fraction of the debt was
paid.165 Doge Dandolo, now in control of the fate of the crusaders, met with the other lords in
Venice and suggested a new offer, stating:
The king of Hungary has captured Zara in Slavonia from us, which
is one of the strongest cities in the world. We will never recover
the city with our own forces except we have the help of these men.
Let’s ask them to help us take Zara, in return for which we will
suspend their debt to us of 34,000 marks of silver until such time
as God allows us and the pilgrims to win sufficient booty
together.166
In 1183, Zara, a Catholic city along the eastern Adriatic coast in the Balkans, had successfully
rebelled and broken off from Venice and was under the protection of the Hungarians. Venice had
previously used the city to increase its military, economic, and political influence in the region.
Economically, Zara had stored much of the excess wealth that was generated in Venice between
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its rebellion left Venice in fear of recession which had
influenced Dandolo’s decision to recapture the city.
A few days after Dandolo’s offer was accepted, a man arrived in the city and changed the
entire trajectory of the crusade. As previously mentioned, Alexios III Angelos had usurped his
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brother Isaac II Angelos and sentenced him to prison along with Isaac’s son, the future emperor
Alexios IV Angelos (r.1203-04). After a few years in prison, Alexios IV Angelos had escaped
and fled the empire with the help of a group of loyalists. He arrived in Venice and immediately
sought the aid of the crusaders. The Marquis Boniface of Montferrat, later the king of
Thessalonica (r. 1205-07), listened to his plea and persuaded Dandolo to help Alexios IV
Angelos after the armies had conquered Egypt.167 This development had serious implications for
the crusaders, the papacy, and the Byzantine empire. Alexios IV Angelos had agreed that for the
crusader’s support in crowning him emperor, he would reunify the Greek church with Rome,
something that Pope Innocent III desired and Alexios III Angelos despised. This was enough to
convince the pope to allow the armies, upon completion of the Egyptian campaign, to lead the
effort in removing the usurper from Constantinople. Dandolo saw the arrival of Alexios IV
Angelos positively and used the heir’s presence for his own political gains. With the arrival of
Alexios IV Angelos in Venice, his commitment to reunify the two churches, and the signing of
new contracts between the crusading leaders and the doge, the armies were finally able to sail
towards Zara.
The crusaders’ military operations and strategic planning for Zara are outside the focus of
this thesis, yet the religious, political, and economic consequences leading up to and following
the siege are important. Prior to the battles, it was customary for all crusading soldiers to make a
vow to God, typically requesting protection and strength from God, remission of sins, and
entrance into Heaven.168 These vows by the soldiers were considered the only contracts they
needed during the campaign. So when the leaders formalized contracts aiding Alexios IV
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Angelos, many soldiers felt betrayed. Desertion became common even before the armies left
Venice and were exacerbated following the capture of Zara. As religious tensions continued
among the lower ranks, the political negotiations that occurred simultaneously between Venice
and the Kingdom of Hungary had stalled. The Hungarians had joined the crusade at the request
of the papacy, most likely to persuade the Byzantines to reunify with the Roman church. If the
city was predominantly Christian and the Hungarians had joined the crusade, why then did the
crusaders attack Zara? The only plausible answer was that the Doge of Venice wanted to
recapture the city and expand Venice’s economic influence in the Balkans, while simultaneously
paying off the crusaders’ debts.
The successful capture of Zara caused new problems for the crusaders, Doge Dandolo,
Alexios IV Angelos, and Innocent III. The battle had raged throughout November of 1202 which
meant that the armies had to wait until the spring of 1203 to sail towards Egypt and Palestine.169
During that winter, thousands of rank-and-file soldiers deserted along with several barons and
lords, many of whom fled towards Hungary. Others felt wary and sinful of their actions against
other Christians. This posed many difficulties that the Venetians and Alexios IV Angelos had to
overcome. For Enrico Dandolo, the Treaty of Venice was set to expire in September 1203 and
most of the conditions had already been met. The only condition that was still outstanding was
the repayment of the Venetian fleet, for which a majority of the costs had already been paid
following the capture of Zara. Final completion of the payment would therefore have to come
from Constantinople. The Massacre of the Latins still influenced Dandolo’s desire for retaliation
and the city’s repeated abuses against the Venetian quarter had to be solved. For Alexios IV
Angelos, the army’s general unrest forced him to capitulate on certain demands from the enlisted
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as he desperately needed their aid in recapturing Constantinople. That winter the Treaty of Zara
was signed as more of an extension to the Treaty of Venice than a new agreement. The deal
outlined the plan for the crusading army to take Constantinople, crown Alexios IV Angelos coemperor with his imprisoned father, and then sail to Egypt.170
The papacy was rightfully angered at the Venetians’ attack on Zara. Innocent III issued
orders of excommunication against both the Venetians and crusaders, yet the order did not reach
the army.171 The guilty consciences of the enlisted soldiers weighed heavily and many feared
their contracts with God were in jeopardy. The crusading bishops sought to mitigate this issue
and reassure the crusaders that their contracts with God were still intact by absolving all soldiers
of their sins.172 These effects led many to demand additional concessions in the Treaty of Zara
and while the leaders included the provision to attack Egypt after Constantinople, no additional
concessions were granted.
The crusaders arrived in Constantinople in the spring of 1203 with the desire for
vengeance against the Greeks. After an unsuccessful siege in 1203 caused three separate fires
that scorched the city, the crusaders finally captured the city in 1204.173 It was at that moment
when tens of thousands of Venetians and Franks began to sack the city. Geoffrey of
Villehardouin wrote on the pillaging that ravaged the city:
There too [in the palace of Blachernae] were found treasures so
very great that there were no fewer than in Bucoleon. Each man
garrisoned the castle that had been given up to him with his own
men and had the treasure guarded. The other men had scattered
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throughout the city and seized much booty, and the spoils were so
great that no one could tell you how much it amounted to in gold,
silver, tableware, precious stones, samite, silk cloth, garments of
vari, grey fur and ermine, and all the fine things that were ever
found on Earth. And Geoffrey of Villehardouin, marshal of
Champagne, bears faithful witness in accordance with his certain
knowledge, that no such spoils were won in any city since the
creation of the world. . . for those who had been in poverty were
now in wealth and luxury.174
The sack of Constantinople was the result of poorly organized retribution on the part of the Doge
of Venice and the leaders of the crusading army. The original intent that was agreed upon at Zara
was that the armies would acquire only enough gold and silver to pay off any remaining debts
owed to the Venetians – between 30,000 and 35,000 marks. Instead, the soldiers ransacked every
building that was still standing and hoarded more than was intended. The leaders of the crusade
and Pope Innocent III became worried about the vengeance taken out on the Greeks and
attempted to remedy the situation. The leaders organized three collection points and demanded
the soldiers return any excess loot that exceeded the predetermined pay from the Treaty of Zara.
Still, many of the Venetians kept their spoils, which forced Innocent III to threaten any soldiers
who failed to return their loot with excommunication. Yet despite these efforts by the papacy and
crusading leaders, the Venetians still held onto their gold.175
The purpose for the collection points was both economically and politically important.
The Treaty of Zara demanded that the crusaders repay any outstanding debts that they owed
Venice and acquire the necessary funds and supplies needed to conquer the Holy Lands.176 Their
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attempt to uphold the treaty was also politically motivated, with the coronation of Alexios IV
Angelos and Isaac II Angelos as co-emperors being at the forefront. Alexios IV Angelos had
promised to reunify the Greek church with Rome, yet to ensure that this and other concessions
were met, the crusading leaders and the Doge of Venice had to give a quid-pro-quo. If the
leaders did not give the concessions and allowed the soldiers to keep their loot, relations between
both churches and all participants may have ended in an altercation. This also made sense
economically. The need to rebuild the empire was one of Alexios IV Angelos’ most pressing
issues. A depleted treasury and no money in circulation would have severely hindered any
attempt to rebuild the empire and defend its Anatolian territories. The logistics of such
transportation would have slowed down the crusaders’ campaign and worsen an already
evaporated morale.
When the crusaders finally repaid their debts and set off towards Egypt, the
Mediterranean had already changed immensely. The Byzantine Empire lay in ruins, destroyed by
a Christian army on its way to Egypt. The Venetians acquired Greek territories and restored trade
rights in Constantinople which allowed them to increase their economic and political influence
throughout the Mediterranean. The influence of the pope had suffered a major setback from
which it never fully recovered. The Pisan and Genoese advanced their economic influences
throughout Europe, while the Ayyubid Caliphate regained its strength and defeated the French
armies in Egypt. So what happened to all the participants of the trade wars and the Fourth
Crusade? How did the crusade fundamentally alter the political sphere throughout the
Mediterranean?

96

VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of the eastern Mediterranean the Fourth Crusade was ranked
among the most significant geo-political transformations. In the twelfth century, trade wars
between the Italian states and the Byzantine Empire had become so extensive and violent that
war appeared as the most plausible outcome. While the Byzantine-Venetian War of 1171 was
entirely limited to naval conflicts, the tensions between the two powers did not cease and instead
only demonstrated the hostilities the ongoing trade war emphasized. The next thirty years
continued to underline the economic disparities in Constantinople between the Italian and Greek
merchants. It was during these decades that the historiography suggested that the roots of the
sack of Constantinople originated. Yet, as shown, the twelfth-century trade wars involving
Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and the Byzantines influenced the decisions by Enrico Dandolo to reroute
the crusading army to the Byzantine capital. For all participants of the Fourth Crusade -- the
Republics of Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, the Byzantine Empire, the Papacy, the French Empire,
and the Ayyubid Caliphate -- the events of 1202-04 produced lasting consequences that shaped
the Mediterranean.
The establishment of the Pisan and Genoese trade quarters in Constantinople stressed the
economic problems Greek subjects faced when trading with the Venetian merchants. Pisan
merchants were at a disadvantage immediately upon arriving in the city. The Chrysobull of 1111
did not include several important privileges that Venice already obtained; instead Pisan
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merchants entered Constantinople with a weakened mercantile infrastructure that failed to garner
enthusiasm for trade. This allowed Venetian merchants to dominate the few Pisan businesses that
were established in the capital. That supremacy, coupled with an absence of interest in trade by
Pisan merchants with the Greeks, drove the Venetian merchants to absorb Pisa’s trade quarter to
use as a proxy for continued economic influence. The disconnect between the Pisan government
and its merchant class was definitive; Pisan merchants would rather trade with their preestablished trade partners across the Mediterranean than trade in Constantinople.
After the Fourth Crusade, the Pisan republic saw a period of territorial, economic, and
religious expansion. It maintained its territorial possessions in Corsica and Sardinia yet lost the
Balearic Islands. The general political stability throughout the Mediterranean allowed the Pisans
to increase their economic activity and acquire trade rights to several cities. The republic’s most
notable areas of economic expansion included southern Italy (Salerno, Naples, and Palermo) and
the Holy Lands, (Antioch, Tyre, and Acre).177 Even the Ayyubid Caliphate granted trade rights to
Pisa and its merchants began trading in Alexandria and Cairo by the beginning of the thirteenth
century. The economic expansion of Pisa following the crusade showed the ability of the
merchants to redirect their efforts and to secure the political support of other kingdoms and
empires.
The Republic of Genoa was in a similar situation to that of the Pisan Republic. Genoese
merchants preferred trading with France, Egypt, England, and the Holy Roman Empire, because
the government acquired suitable and bilateral trade agreements.178 These relationships proved
profitable which suggests that Genoese trade in the eastern Mediterranean was secondary to
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western European trade. Genoa’s longstanding legal code on financial investment proved to be
the factor that allowed Genoese merchants to survive and thrive after 1204. The joint-investment
strategy allowed Genoa to seek out more cities for trade while maintaining minimal financial risk
to investors. Unlike the Venetians, who had a higher financial risk associated with trade and thus
had to aggressively influence specific markets, the Genoese could focus their attention on
multiple cities at once. Genoa’s first Chrysobull granted commercial and trade rights similar to
Venice’s which, combined with the joint venture model, produced strong profits and increased
incentive to trade.
After the Fourth Crusade, Genoese trade was briefly diminished as the Venetians
established the Latin Empire in Constantinople. Genoa’s trade routes throughout the eastern
Mediterranean were severely impacted as a result. After failed attempts to divert their
investments elsewhere, Genoa reached an alliance with Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos of
Nicaea (r. 1259-61). Angered by the Venice’s actions in the Fourth Crusade, Michael VIII
Palaiologos sought to recapture Constantinople and reinstall a Greek emperor in the city. Upon
the successful recapture of Constantinople in 1261, the Genoese enjoyed immense commercial
power in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Papacy’s role in politics fundamentally changed after the Fourth Crusade. The
beginning of this transformation of political power began with Innocent III’s uncle, Pope
Clement III, and his liberalization of papal authority. Clement III’s reforms attempted to
decrease the political power of the papacy within the Christian kingdoms. This attempt was met
with mixed results within Rome and the European kingdoms. When Innocent III was elected as
pontiff, he had attempted to strengthen papal authority over the Christian kingdoms throughout
Europe. These attempts initially proved to be successful with the Kingdom of Hungary and the
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Empire of Bulgaria and Wallachia reconverting from the Greek to the Roman church.179 Yet,
despite these successful attempts at reconversion, the papacy suffered enormous repercussions
after the Fourth Crusade. Papal authority had been mostly relegated to the Papal states and its
territories. Continued attempts to restore papal authority by issuance of more military actions by
Innocent III failed.180 The result was that many western European kingdoms distrusted not only
papal bulls calling for holy wars but also the pope’s authority over the European kingdoms.
Since the end of the Fourth Crusade, the papacy never regained its prominence and
authority in everyday life nor succeeded in raising a large enough crusading force to reclaim the
Holy Lands. The following crusades never reached the success nor size of their predecessors and
all failed more spectacularly. The Fifth Crusade (1217-21) attempted to replicate the original
plans of the Fourth Crusade, but because the Ayyubid Caliphate had roughly twenty years to
rebuild from the infighting, the crusaders were heavily defeated.181 The Sixth Crusade (1228-9)
saw almost no military actions, instead opting for political maneuvering that saw minimal
success in regaining lands for the Kingdom of Jerusalem.182 The Seventh Crusade (1248-54) did
not garner any popularity and as such, failed to recapture Jerusalem.183 Other crusades included
the Children’s Crusade (1212), which had failed spectacularly, and the Baron’s Crusade (1239),
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which was the most successful campaign in terms of territorial gains since the First Crusade.184
Despite these crusades and their various successes and failures, one thing was clear: the military
and political power of the papacy had evaporated.
The Republic of Venice, the only true “winner” of the Fourth Crusade, emerged as a
continental power. Its geographic advantage allowed the republic to invest heavily in seaborne
mercantile trade. The conquest of the eastern Adriatic and the political alliances in central and
southern Italy secured a prominent shipping route for Venice’s merchants while also establishing
protection for land routes. Venice used its trade networks across the eastern Mediterranean,
particularly the Venetian quarter in Constantinople, as a midway point for its merchants to stop
between Venice and the Crusader States and Egypt.
Venice’s trade relation with the Byzantines was initially celebrated because it was the
first major European power to establish a trade quarter within the city’s walls. The introduction
of the Venetian trade quarter was complemented with several financial privileges that had
allowed trade to thrive and profits to increase. Despite these privileges and initial enthusiasm
from the Byzantines, the Venetian economic ambitions grew. Venice demanded new Chrysobulls
meant to increase its shares in several important industries while increasing profits for Venetian
merchants. The new Chrysobulls were also meant to compete with and dissuade Pisan and
Genoese merchants from trading in Constantinople. These included tax exemptions on imported
goods, acquiring immovable property to increase the size and influence of the trade quarter, and
the creation of a scala to circumvent export taxes. While these privileges certainly helped drive
higher income and revenue, competition with the Pisan and Genoese merchants created more
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unilateral Chrysobulls that descended into a century-long trade war that influenced the sack of
Constantinople.
This trade war, primarily between the Venetians and Byzantines, was exacerbated by the
election of Enrico Dandolo as Doge of Venice. Dandolo’s objectives were to increase the
financial influence in Constantinople and Byzantine dependence on Venetian markets. The
Venetian merchants demanded a new currency that did not rely on the Veronese coins which
threatened Venetian commerce when the Veronese coins were devalued in 1180. Dandolo
instructed to mint a new currency that was more portable and less volatile. The new Venetian
grosso proved effective in reforming the Venetian economy and increased the dependency of
Byzantine subjects on the Venetian currency.
The Fourth Crusade proved successful for the Venetians. Doge Dandolo was repaid in
full for the cost of the Venetian fleet that was intended to transport the crusaders to Egypt. With
the city occupied by the Venetian and crusading armies, Dandolo began to introduce new
economic reforms that were meant to rebuild the city after the siege and those reforms favored
Venetian commerce. Venetian commercial dominance in the Aegean became absolute and the
republic’s influence began to spread throughout the entire eastern Mediterranean. Politically and
territorially, the small republic had become an empire. After 1204, Venice had acquired a
significant amount of territory that fortified its mercantile shipping and cemented its economic
power. These included the island of Crete (1204-1669), Euboea (1204-1470), and several port
cities in Crimea (1204-mid thirteenth century).185 The success at Constantinople allowed Venice
the economic, political, and cultural foundations to thrive as an important European power from
the thirteenth to the sixteenth century.
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The Byzantine Empire suffered the greatest in all measurable facets: economic, political,
religious, and cultural. The twelfth-century trade wars with the Italian states proved too difficult
to curb for the Byzantine leaders. The Byzantines’ hopes for strong trade partners led to several
Chrysobulls that granted exceptional trade privileges from 1100 to 1140. These privileges were
too generous and as trade increased during this time, so too did the Italians’ market shares in
important industries within Constantinople. The economic reforms under Manuel I Komnenos
attempted to redirect control of the Byzantine markets from Venetian control. The reforms
included a systematic redesign of the urban geography which saw the relocation of the agoras to
the southern half of the city, away from the Italian trade quarters. The construction of new ports
was designed to give the Byzantine merchants greater access to shipping and trade. Manuel I
Komnenos mandated that all stores be reorganized into guilds, backed by the imperial
administration, which strengthened the influence of Byzantine artisans who were competing with
Italian merchants. While these reforms were successful at protecting Byzantine merchants and
goods, they also aggravated the Italian states and emboldened them to take increasingly hostile
actions.
After Manuel I Komnenos’ death, Byzantine attempts to reduce Venetian economic
influence only caused often violent reactions. These actions influenced Doge Dandolo, whose
reforms punished Byzantine merchants. With the announcement of a new crusade against the
Ayyubid Caliphate, Doge Dandolo gladly accepted the request to provide a navy to transport the
armies. Using political cunning and financial savvy, he successfully negotiated a contract with
the crusaders, a contract that put the army into debt. The debt allowed Dandolo to control the
army and reroute it from Egypt to Constantinople.

103

The sack of Constantinople was devastating for the Byzantines politically. The empire
was occupied by the Venetians and crusading leaders who crowned Alexios IV Angelos as coemperor with his father Isaac II Angelos. As the crusaders were in control of the city and the
Greek church temporarily absorbed into the Roman church, the Latin Empire emerged. The
result of the reorganization into the Latin Empire was the division of the lands into three
successor states: the Despotate of Epirus, the Empire of Nicaea, and the Empire of Trebizond.186
All three claimed to be the legitimate successors to the Byzantine Empire as all three maintained
the Greek church. It would be the Empire of Nicaea that would successfully recapture
Constantinople and dissolve the Roman church. Simultaneously to this period of political chaos,
the Mongol invasion drove a mass migration of Muslims into Anatolia leading to the Ottoman
rise in the fifteenth century.
At the beginning of this thesis you stood on a blood-stained street, laying witness to
unbearable death and destruction. The great city of Constantinople was burning as soldiers
ransacked stores and homes. The Fourth Crusade was an event long remembered as the crusade
that attacked a Christian city, a crusade that was not like the others, and a crusade spoiled by
greed and vengeance. For every participant of the trade wars and crusade, the events of 1204
proved to be either the beginning or the end of their economic, political, and cultural identity.
The Fourth Crusade’s greatest impact was on the Byzantine Empire and whether because of the
political or economic reasons suggested, the picture is nonetheless clear. For every reform the
Byzantines enacted, for every step towards economic sovereignty, the heirs of the Roman
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Empire regrettably took two steps backward. Perhaps the simplest way to understand the
tumultuous events of the eleventh and twelfth centuries can be best described thus: when one
great empire falls, another rises in its place. Indeed, the Byzantine Empire had fallen and the
Republic of Venice rose up in its place.
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